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Abstract 
Film is a ubiquitous medium.  However, the process by which we comprehend film narratives is 
not well understood.  Reading research has shown a strong connection between eye-movements 
and comprehension.  In four experiments we tested whether the eye-movement and 
comprehension relationship held for films.  This was done by manipulating viewer 
comprehension by starting participants at different points in a film, and then tracking their eyes.  
Overall, the manipulation created large differences in comprehension, but only found small 
difference in eye-movements.  In a condition of the final experiment, a task manipulation was 
designed to prioritize different stimulus features.  This task manipulation created large 
differences in eye-movements when compared to participants freely viewing the clip.  These 
results indicate that with the implicit task of narrative comprehension, top-down comprehension 
processes have little effect on eye-movements.  To allow for strong, volitional top-down control 
of eye-movements in film, task manipulations need to make features that are important to 
comprehension irrelevant to the task. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Watching highly produced dynamic scenes such as film, television, and online video is a 
ubiquitous activity around the world.  People seem to comprehend these dynamic scenes without 
much effortful processing, but little is known about the processes involved in this comprehension 
(Smith, Levin, & Cutting, 2012).  Furthermore, while watching a film, viewers typically move 
their eyes 2-5 times per second in order to extract information from it, and those eye-movements 
are most likely related to viewers’ understanding of the film they are watching (Smith, 2013).  
Causally, this relationship can go in two directions: attention leading to comprehension 
differences, or what is being comprehended guiding attention.  The primary concern of the 
current study is on the latter case.  Namely, does a viewer’s comprehension of a film influence 
their eye-movements while watching it? Although little previous research has addressed this 
question, there are two well-developed lines of previous research that are highly relevant: 
research on eye-movements and reading comprehension and research on eye-movements in static 
and dynamic scenes. 
 
 Top-down and bottom-up effects on eye-movements  
At a broad level, comprehension processes for narrative content have been studied in the 
realm of language processing, typically in the context of reading (McNamara & Magliano, 2009, 
for review), and it has been shown that readers’ eye-movements differ based on their 
comprehension of what they are reading (Rayner, 1998, for review).  For example, during 
reading it has been shown that systematic regressive eye-movements are made when readers 
realize they have incorrectly interpreted something earlier in the story (Frazier & Rayner, 1982).  
Findings such as these are the basis of the eye-mind hypothesis (Just & Carpenter, 1980; Reichle, 
Pollatsek, Fisher, & Rayner, 1998; Reilly & Radach, 2006) that eye-movements are driven by 
online cognitive processes.  From this, one would expect a connection between each movie 
viewer’s comprehension and their eye-movements.  More specifically, when movie viewers have 
different information incorporated into their mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983) which they 
use to comprehend a narrative film, it seems reasonable that they would attend to different 
aspects of the film stimulus in order to update their mental model, namely the information that is 
present in their mental models will influence the information they attend to in the film.   
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 Similar top-down effects on attention are found during scene viewing.  When viewing 
static scenes, eye-movements can be affected by volitional top-down processes such as the goal 
or task of the viewer (Henderson, 2007; Henderson & Hollingworth, 1998, for review), and by 
more mandatory top-down processes such as looking at faces (Baluch & Itti, 2011; Birmingham, 
Bischof, & Kingstone, 2008).  The same is true when watching video clips, in which the where 
and when of viewer attention on a screen is influenced by both volitional processes such as the 
goals of the viewer (Smith & Mital, 2013), and mandatory processes such as who is speaking 
(Coutrot & Guyader, 2014; Ho, Foulsham, & Kingstone, 2015; Vo, Smith, Mital, & Henderson, 
2012).  Alternatively, bottom-up features of scenes (i.e., features of the stimulus such as color, 
edges, and motion) are also known to have strong effects on visual attention (Itti, 2005; Mital, 
Smith, Hill, & Henderson, 2010), without affecting the interpretation of the scene (Latif, 
Gehmacher, Castelhano, & Munhall, 2014).  In dynamic scenes the role of bottom-up features 
are thought to be very strong, such that when viewing highly produced dynamic scenes like a 
Hollywood film trailer, people tend to look in that same places at the same time, known as 
attentional synchrony.  (Dorr, Martinetz, Gegenfurtner, & Barth, 2010; Hasson et al., 2008; 
Smith & Mital, 2013).  This is very different from static scenes and natural dynamic scenes in 
which viewers tend to look at similar points of interest, but not at the same time (Mannan, 
Ruddock, & Wooding, 1997). 
 
 Film narrative is unique 
 There are differences between the linguistic and visual modalities of narrative 
representation that need to be accounted for when researching comprehension in visual narratives 
(Magliano, Loschky, Clinton, & Larson, 2013).  For example, written text is composed of 
distinct words arranged in lines and paragraphs on a page, and readers typically fixate every 
content word (noun, verb, adjective, and adverb) in a line, progressing from left to right (in 
English).  In contrast, films are composed of moving images within a frame, but there are no 
stated rules for how film viewers should watch them, though filmmakers follow numerous 
conventions in creating them (Smith, 2012).  Also, film shots are typically viewed serially from 
beginning to end, unless a solitary film viewer uses a remote control with pause and rewind 
functions.  This is in contrast with reading in which the reader controls their pace of reading and 
makes regressive eye-movements when they have difficulty understanding something.   
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 Similarly, the highly produced nature of film contains several features that exert strong 
bottom-up control and increase attentional synchrony (Smith, 2013).  The bottom-up features 
include motion (Mital et al., 2010), editing (Wang, Freeman, Merriam, Hasson, & Heeger, 2012), 
and lighting (Cutting, Brunick, DeLong, Iricinschi, & Candan, 2011; Smith & Mital, 2013).  
Additionally, highly produced dynamic scenes often compose scenes to include few points of 
interest, or are constructed such that the bottom-up features guide attention to a single point of 
interest (Cutting, 2015).  Compared to highly produced film, the features of static text, static 
scenes, and natural dynamic scenes have relatively weak bottom-up features, and thus many 
studies have shown strong top-down effects on eye-movements when using such stimuli 
(Rayner, 1998; Smith & Mital, 2013; Yarbus, 1967).  All of the above differences between films 
with reading and other types of scene viewing suggest that a simple analogy between how 
viewers process each is likely to be wrong.   
 
 Comprehension and eye-movements in film 
 The few studies that have tested top-down effects on eye-movements in film have what 
appear to be contradictory effects.  Lahnakoski et al. (2014) found that giving viewers an explicit 
task to take a certain perspective (interior decorator or detective) can have a top-down effect on 
eye-movements.  Alternatively, in an earlier study testing the same research question of how 
comprehension processes affect eye-movements, Loschky, Larson, Magliano, and Smith (2015) 
presented participants with a scene from the James Bond film Moonraker (Broccoli & Gilbert, 
1979).  They found that participants had large differences in comprehension, but there were 
relatively weak effects of comprehension on eye-movements.  The eye-movement differences 
occurred during a single shot of the clip that was essentially a static image that allowed 
participant gaze to explore the image.  In other words, the static nature of the scene may have 
allowed for eye-movement differences similar to those found in previous experiments using 
static scenes (DeAngelus & Pelz, 2009; Smith & Mital, 2013; Yarbus, 1967).  Nonetheless, the 
overall lack of eye-movement differences were striking given the large effects typically found 
during static scene viewing, and the effects found for perspective taking (Lahnakoski et al., 
2014) and location based viewing tasks (Smith & Mital, 2013).  Smith & Mital (2013) and Taya, 
Windridge, & Osman (2012) give some converging evidence for a lack of top-down effects 
during conditions similar to free-viewing.  This raises the critically important question addressed 
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in the current study, namely, why and when is there a general dissociation between eye-
movements and film comprehension, which fails to support the eye-mind hypothesis in film 
viewing? 
 
 What may allow for top-down effects of attention in film? 
 To create a strong test of top-down effects in film, criteria were developed to choose a 
clip based on its bottom-up features and what it afforded in terms of top-down manipulations.  
First, the clip needed to lack specific bottom-up features that create attentional synchrony, which 
should enhance the opportunity for top-down processes to differentially guide viewers’ eye-
movements while watching the clip.  Many film sequences show only a single primary object of 
interest in each shot, such as the James Bond Moonraker clip used in Loschky et al. (2015), 
which limits the opportunities for attention to be shifted to different screen locations.  
Conversely, some film segments contain many different things to look at, which should reduce 
the degree of attentional synchrony as different people may look at different things in the film 
frame.  Likewise, each time there is a film cut (i.e., a switch between camera shots) there is a 
sudden decrease and then increase in attentional synchrony as viewers search for and then find 
the point of central interest in the new shot (Carmi & Itti, 2006; Mital et al., 2010; Wang et al., 
2012).  However, on rare occasions there are film sequences lacking any cuts for long periods of 
time (long-takes), thus removing the “resetting” happening after each cut.  We chose one of the 
most famous long-takes in film history, the opening scene of the re-edited
1
 version of Orson 
Welles’ Touch of Evil (Welles, 1958).  What makes this film opening so famous is that it is a 
very complex scene with many characters and points of visual interest to potentially look at that 
unfolds over three minutes.  Although this clip has all the filmmaking mastery of a typical 
Hollywood style film, in comparison to the Moonraker clip (Broccoli & Gilbert, 1979) used in 
Loschky et al. (2015), it is much closer to a natural scene (i.e., no cuts, and many different things 
                                                 
1
 There are two major differences between the original and re-edited versions of Touch of Evil.  First, the original 
used the opening scene for the credits of the movie.  These were removed from the re-edited version so that all the 
visual information on the screen is directly related to the story being told.  Second, the sound mix was redone to only 
include diegetic (i.e., meaningful real-world) sounds instead of having a film score playing over the entire scene. 
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to look at in the film frame), and thus it may allow for more influence of top-down processes 
involved in comprehension to differentially guide viewers’ eye-movements. 
 To create top-down effects it may also be necessary to require the viewer to acquire 
information from different regions within the scene.  For example, Taya and colleagues (2012) 
did not find differences in eye-movements when experts and novices watched a tennis match.  
One likely reason for this is that regardless of expertise, there was only one activity to watch—
namely the ball and the player whose court the ball was in.  Conversely, Smith and Mital (2013) 
asked participants to free view a dynamic scene or to identify the location it was filmed in.  
When identifying the location, participants had to focus on the background, while during free 
viewing participants could look at the people and actions occurring in the scene.  For the current 
study, choosing a clip with multiple objects allows for a top-down manipulation that may require 
viewers to look in different places.   
 The narrative content of the opening shot of Touch of Evil allows for just such a 
manipulation of comprehension at the situation model level (Kintsch, 1998; van Dijk & Kintsch, 
1983).  This is a manipulation of viewer’s mental representation based on the information 
available about the events in the film.  The clip opens on a close-up of someone setting a time 
bomb (Figure 1).  The time bomb is then placed into the trunk of a car, after which a couple 
unknowingly gets into the car and drive off, as the camera follows them.  Importantly, after the 
bomb is put into the car, it is not seen again for the remainder of the clip.  During viewing this 
creates a very suspenseful experience for the viewer as they wait for the time bomb to explode as 
they watch the events of the scene unfold.  Knowledge of the bomb is what makes the clip so 
powerful.  Without the bomb, it is just a mundane shot of people and cars on a street.  Therefore, 
our comprehension manipulation plays on the power of the bomb to create suspense in what 
would otherwise be a mundane scene.  Knowledge of the bomb thus creates a situation where 
viewers might pay more attention to the car, while those without knowledge of the bomb may be 
freer to explore other objects and characters in the scene. 
To manipulate knowledge of the bomb, we used the jumped-in-the-middle paradigm 
developed by Loschky et al. (2015).  This manipulation creates the common experience of 
coming into a television program or film part way through and then trying to comprehend what is 
happening.  Specifically, there are two groups, Context and No-context, in which the Context 
group participants see the entire clip, while the No-context group miss a certain portion of the 
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clip at the beginning—in this case, the portion showing a time bomb being put into the car.  
Throughout the four experiments in this study, there were three starting points used.  For all four 
experiments, the Context condition started at the beginning of the opening scene of Touch of Evil 
with a close up of the bomb that is then placed in the car.  After the bomb is placed in the car and 
the villain runs away, a couple who are unaware of the bomb gets into the car and begins to drive 
down busy streets going in and out of the shot.  Halfway through the clip a walking couple (Mr.  
and Mrs. Vargas) is introduced as new protagonists as the camera begins to follow them.  
Towards the end of the clip (Figure 1), the walking couple and the couple in the car reach a 
border checkpoint.  After some time there, the walking couple passes through, with the clip 
ending as the walking couple are shown kissing in a close up.  The No-context condition for 
Experiments 1 and 2 started just after the bomb is placed in the car, as the couple walked up to 
the car.  Thus, the comprehension manipulation in Experiments 1 and 2 was knowledge of the 
bomb.  In Experiments 3 and 4 the No-context group started watching the film while the walking 
couple was on the screen but the car was off-screen.  With this alternative No-context 
manipulation there were two main differences between the context groups: knowledge of the 
bomb and the perceived protagonists of the clip.  The Context group may have perceived the 
couple in the car, and potentially the walking couple, as protagonists, while the No-context group 
were likely to perceive only the walking couple as the protagonists.  Along with testing whether 
weaker bottom-up features would allow for a stronger effect of top-down attention on eye-
movements, having two No-context conditions that manipulated different aspects of viewers’ 
situation models (hereafter referred to more generically as mental models) allowed us to test 
different information sources used for comprehension.  Finally, an additional condition in 
Experiment 4 tested the effect of task on eye-movements similar to Smith & Mital (2013) and 
Lahnakoski et al. (2014).  The task manipulation made comprehension for the film narrative 
irrelevant, which allowed for comparisons of effects due to comprehension versus task. 
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Figure 1. Frames illustrating important shots in the 3 minute 12 second clip from the film Touch 
of Evil (Welles, 1958). 
 
The manipulation of context (i.e., whether participants saw the bomb) should lead to 
different mental models for the target segment of film (e.g., Bransford & Johnson, 1972).  That 
is, in the Context condition (i.e., viewers who saw the bomb placed in the car), a token for the car 
should be represented in participants’ mental models for the film segment.  That token should be 
reactivated every time the car is in the frame, which should then lead to the reactivation of the 
memory representation of the bomb and the life-threatening events it could cause for characters 
near it (e.g., Myers, & O’Brien, 1998).  Conversely, in the No-context condition (i.e., viewers 
who did not see the bomb put in the car), the car had no particularly salient causal connections in 
the unfolding narrative, other than as a means of transportation for the couple in it.  Thus, it 
should simply be a part of the backgrounded events and should be relatively weakly represented 
in the mental model.  It is therefore reasonable to hypothesize that there would be a greater 
likelihood of viewers fixating on the car in the Context condition than in the No-context 
condition.  Alternatively, one might hypothesize that consistent with the results of Loschky et al. 
(2015), the attentional synchrony created by the bottom-up features of this highly produced film 
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might wash out any differences in eye-movements that would be expected to occur based on 
differences in viewers’ mental models.  However, in comparison to the James Bond Moonraker 
clip used in the Loschky et al. (2015) study, the comparatively weaker bottom-up features of the 
Touch of Evil clip used should theoretically give the top-down comprehension processes a 
greater chance to guide attention.  Based on these arguments, the two competing hypotheses for 
this study were: 
 
Mental Model Hypothesis: Top-down processes (involved in comprehension) will guide 
viewer attention creating low attentional synchrony between Context and No-context 
conditions 
  
Tyranny of Film Hypothesis: Bottom-up features will guide attention and wash out any 
comprehension-based differences between groups 
 
Support for the mental model hypothesis would involve the Context and No-context 
groups producing different eye-movement patterns while viewing the clip.  Specifically, viewers 
in the Context condition with knowledge of the bomb would be expected to maintain that 
information in their mental model throughout the film clip, and therefore spend more time 
attending to bomb-relevant information in the scene, such as the car (and its trunk) containing the 
bomb.  Conversely, in the No-context condition, viewers would not be expected to give as much 
attention to these bomb-relevant elements.  Conversely, support for the tyranny of film 
hypothesis would be evidenced by both groups of viewers showing similar eye-movement 
patterns while watching the clip.   
 
 Study overview 
 This study adopted an experimental case study approach, in that it used a single film clip 
of the opening scene of Touch of Evil (Welles, 1958), and then experimentally manipulated 
viewers’ comprehension of that clip in a number of experiments.  Similar experimental case 
study approaches have been used in a number of psychological studies that involved highly 
ecologically valid stimuli for which it was difficult to produce multiple instantiations (Bransford 
& Johnson, 1972; Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Loschky et al., 2015; Simons & Chabris, 1999; 
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Simons & Levin, 1998; Smith, Lamont, & Henderson, 2012).  Two sets of experiments were run, 
each starting with an experiment testing participant comprehension, and then using the 
comprehension results to support an eye-movement experiment. 
 In the first set of experiments (Experiments 1 and 2), Experiment 1 measured 
comprehension by asking participants to generate a predictive inference of what would happen 
next at the end of the video clip.  It was expected that participants in the Context condition who 
knew about the bomb in the car would be more likely to infer an explosion (or related event) than 
participants in the No-context condition who did not know about the bomb.  This first 
experiment was important for two reasons. First, it was used to establish that the jumped-in-the-
middle paradigm produced a strong effect on comprehension. Second, it manipulated the 
presence of audio to test whether it would have an effect on inference generation. Experiment 2 
then introduced eye-tracking to test the effects of such comprehension differences on eye-
movements, but was otherwise procedurally the same as Experiment 1.  Furthermore, 
Experiment 1 included audio and no-audio conditions, to test for the importance of sound in 
heightening viewer suspense in the clip (Tully, 1999).   
In the second set of experiments (Experiments 3 and 4), the No-context condition was 
changed to manipulate not only knowledge of the bomb, but also the perceived protagonist(s) of 
the clip (see figure 1).  In Experiment 3 using this new No-context condition, in addition to 
measuring comprehension at the end of the clip with the predictive inference measure, we also 
measured working memory to test whether participants higher in working memory were more 
likely to make the inference about the bomb in the Context condition.  This was of interest based 
on studies of reading, in which individuals with higher working memory tend to have better 
comprehension (Allbritton, 2004; Calvo, 2001, 2005; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Daneman & 
Merikle, 1996; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Linderholm, 2002; Rai, Loschky, & Harris, 2014; Rai, 
Loschky, Harris, Peck, & Cook, 2011; St George, Mannes, & Hoffman, 1997).  As an on-line 
measure of comprehension participants also completed an event segmentation task (Newtson, 
1973).  Event segmentation has been shown to be sensitive to viewers’ perceived event structure 
of both natural and narrative films.  Experiment 4 was split into sub-experiments 4a and 4b.  
Experiment 4a measured viewers’ eye-movements during viewing in the Context and new No-
context conditions.  Experiment 4b added a condition that instructed participants to draw a map 
of the scene depicted.  This tested the effect of a cognitive task manipulation at odds with 
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comprehending the narrative, similar to the task manipulations in Lahnakoski et al. (2014) and 
Smith & Mital (2013).  The control condition helps to place the effect of comprehension on eye-
movements in the larger theoretical context of top-down task effects on eye-movements.   
 
  
11 
Chapter 2 - Experiment 1: Predictive Inference Generation 
 Method 
 Participants  
There were 94 participants included in data analyses (54 females; mean age = 18.6 years; 
SD = 1.3).  A total of 116 participants started the experiment, but 22 did not give an inference at 
the end of the experiment
2
.  All participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to one of four 
viewing conditions of the opening scene of Touch of Evil.  The participants included in data 
analysis had a fairly equal representation in each condition (Context + Audio, n = 21; Context + 
No-Audio, n = 29, No-context + Audio, n = 24, No-context + No-Audio, n = 20)
3
.  Participants 
were Kansas State University undergraduate students participating in the study for course 
research credit.  Application to the University Institutional Review Board determined this and all 
following experiments in the study posed minimal risk to the participants (i.e., exempt under the 
criteria set forth in the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects), and informed 
consent was determined to be unnecessary.   
 
 Stimuli 
 Two clips from the opening scene of Orson Welles Touch of Evil were used (Welles, 
1958).  The Context version shows a bomb being placed in a car trunk at the beginning, and runs 
for 3:12.  The No-context version omits the first 18 seconds when the bomb is placed in the car, 
and runs for 2:54.  Both clips end with a close up of the walking couple kissing.  The Context 
and No-context conditions were presented in both Audio and No-audio conditions.  The presence 
of audio was manipulated because one of the key purposes of the audio track was to maintain the 
suspense of the bomb.  To do this the car that had the bomb in it also had its radio playing.  
Throughout the clip as the car moves towards and away from the camera, the sound of the radio 
                                                 
2
 It is unclear why there was a relatively high dropout rate for this online experiment.  However, the dropout rate did 
not appear to have affected the results, because the inference results from this experiment were replicated in the 
following in person experiments. 
3
 The unequal number of participants in each condition occurred because not all participants completed the online 
study, and those participants were not included in any analyses.  In total 116 participants began the study, with 22 
not finishing it.   
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gets accordingly louder and softer.  No mention of the bomb is made in the dialogue except for a 
comment referring to “hearing a ticking noise” made by the female passenger of the car near the 
very end of the clip.  Adobe Premiere Pro was used to edit the clips into the two conditions at a 
frame rate of 30 frames per second (fps), and a resolution of 1080 x 720 pixels.  As this was an 
online study, participants viewed the video on their personal computer at an unspecified viewing 
distance. 
 
 Procedure 
 In all four conditions the experimental procedure was the same.  Participants first 
followed a link to the online study.  Next, they were told they would see a short video clip.  
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of four Context x Audio conditions.   
 After viewing the video clip, participants were presented with a series of written 
questions.  To check whether participants in the Context condition maintained the bomb in their 
mental model, the first question was, “What do you think will happen next?” and they were 
prompted to type their written response in a text box.  The next two questions were to ensure 
participants had not seen the clip before.  The second question was, “Have you seen this film 
before?” and they pressed a “Yes” or “No” button in response.  If participants answered “Yes,” 
they were presented with the third question, “What is the name of this film?” to which they were 
prompted to provide their written answer in a text box.  No participants reported seeing the film 
before. 
 
 Data analysis 
To identify whether participants’ predictive inferences at the end of the clip were 
influenced by having the bomb in their mental model, we had two research assistants code each 
inference, with coders blind to the condition from which each response was taken.  Coding was 
conducted with all 116 participants that began the online study.  If no response was given, it was 
coded as ‘0’ and excluded from further analysis; responses having no mention of the bomb or an 
explosion were coded as ‘1’; unclear responses were coded as ‘2’; responses making clear 
reference to the bomb or an explosion were coded as ‘3’.  The coders had a relatively high level 
of inter-rater reliability, producing Cohen’s Kappa = .892, p < .001.  Discrepancies between the 
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two coders were resolved through discussion.  Unclear responses (coded as ‘2’) were resolved as 
relating to the bomb or not, resulting in a final dichotomous coding indicating whether 
participant predictions mentioned the bomb ‘1’, or did not mention the bomb ‘0’. 
 
 Results & Discussion 
 Once coding was completed, Chi Square tests were used to test whether there were 
differences in the frequencies of making a prediction about the bomb, between the Context or 
No-context conditions and in the Audio or No-Audio conditions.  As shown in Figure 2, 
unsurprisingly, there were large differences in whether participants made a bomb-relevant 
predictive inference based on their viewing context (X
2 
(1, N = 94) = 28.517, p < .001; Eta = 
.551), with participants who saw the bomb at the beginning being much more likely (56%) to 
make an inference about it than those who did not see it (4.5%) [Figure 2].  Interestingly, within 
the Context condition, those in the Audio condition were much more likely to draw bomb-related 
inferences (76%) than those in the No-audio condition (41%)( X
2
 (1, N = 50) = 5.99, p = .014; 
Eta = .346).  Nevertheless, there was no significant difference between audio conditions when 
collapsed across context (X2 (1, N = 94) = 2.597, p = .107; Eta = .166), indicating that drawing 
the inference was primarily dependent on having prior knowledge of the bomb.  For this reason it 
was quite surprising to find that two participants in the No-context +Audio condition did make a 
predictive inference about the bomb exploding, since they had not seen the bomb.  These 
participants did not indicate having seen the film before.  However, a possible explanation is that 
they were able to make the inference due to a character in the car (which contained the time 
bomb) mentioning “hearing a ticking noise” towards the end of the clip.  This would also help 
explain why in the Context condition, the Audio group outperformed the No-audio group.  
Specifically, perhaps some viewers in the Context + Audio condition forgot about the bomb but 
were reminded of it near the end of the film clip when they heard the “ticking” comment. There 
was even one participant in the No-context + Audio condition who made the inference, which is 
more evidence that the “ticking” comment helped participants make the inference about the 
bomb.  Conversely, if there were an equal proportion of participants in the Context + No-audio 
condition who forgot about the bomb, they would not have been reminded of the bomb, because 
they could not hear the “ticking” comment.  If so, then the difference in performance between the 
Context + Audio versus the Context + No-audio groups (76% - 41% = 35%) would represent the 
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proportion of Context condition participants who forgot about the bomb.  We later tested this 
hypothesis in Experiment 3.  In addition, a possible future experiment to test whether the 
“ticking” comment was driving the Audio condition advantage could simply remove the 
comment from the audio condition.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Probability of making inference about the bomb.  Context condition is on the left, and 
No-context is on the right.  Audio condition is in purple, and No-Audio is in striped yellow. 
 
 The strong effect of context (knowledge of the bomb) on making bomb-relevant 
inferences is not surprising.  However, it is important for the study, because it establishes that the 
context manipulation produces clear differences in the information participants have in their 
mental models as they view the film clip.  With participants showing this difference in inference 
generation and mental model construction, there is support for running the eye-tracking 
experiment to test whether differences in comprehension will produce differences in eye-
movements.  There are a number of eye-movement differences that could be expected due to the 
comprehension differences.  First, participants in the Context condition that are following the 
15 
narrative should experience some suspense during viewing, which has been shown to narrow 
attentional focus during film viewing (Bezdek et al., 2015).  This narrowing of attention could 
create even higher attentional synchrony among the Context condition participants.  Second, 
related to the higher attentional synchrony, participants in the Context condition may be expected 
to be more likely to guide their attention to the car with the bomb in it, because this is the most 
important causal event index of the narrative event model for comprehension of the clip.  If 
comprehension is guiding attention, No-context participants would be expected to explore the 
narrative space more, showing less attentional synchrony and fewer looks at the car since they do 
not know it contains the bomb.  
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Chapter 3 - Experiment 2: Context and Eye-movements 
 Method 
Experiment 2 tested the effect of the comprehension differences produced in Experiment 
1 on viewers’ eye-movements while watching the film clip.  Because differences in 
comprehension due to the Context manipulation were greatest in the Audio condition in 
Experiment 1 (see Figure 1), only the Audio condition was included in Experiment 2. 
 
 Participants 
 There were 84 participants (61 females; mean age = 18.6; SD = 1.4) who were pseudo-
randomly assigned to one of two viewing conditions for the opening scene of Touch of Evil 
(Context: n = 42; No-context: n = 42).  Participants were undergraduate students at Kansas State 
University who participated for course research credit.   
 
 Stimuli 
The stimuli were identical to those in Experiment 1 in the Audio condition.  The video 
clips were shown on a 17” ViewSonic Graphics Series CRT monitor (Model G90fb).  A chin and 
forehead rest set a fixed viewing distance of 60.96 cm.  The screen subtended 21.42° x 16.10° of 
visual angle. 
 
 Procedure 
 All participants were told that they would be shown a video clip while their eyes were 
tracked.  Eye tracking was done using an EyeLink1000 eye tracker, which samples eye position 
1000 times per second (1000 Hz) with an average spatial accuracy of 0.5° of visual angle, and a 
maximum error of 1°.  Participants went through a nine point calibration routine, after which the 
experiment began.  An eye-movement trigger was used to ensure that the video started at the 
beginning of a fixation.  To start a trial, while the participant was looking at the central fixation 
point, they pressed a button which moved the fixation point 13.65° to right of center.  Once the 
participant fixated the new point, it moved back to the center.  During the saccade (velocity > 
30°/sec) back to the center, the video began to play.  In this way, any saccadic inhibition (which 
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increases the current fixation duration), caused by the motion transient due to the sudden onset of 
the video clip, was masked by the viewer’s own eye-movement (Reingold & Stampe, 2000, 
2002).  Participants then watched the video, uninterrupted, until the moment when the couple 
kisses (3:12 into the Context condition and 2:54 into the No-context condition).  At the end of 
the video all participants were asked, “What will happen next?” and responses were collected 
using the computer keyboard.  The next question asked was, “Have you seen this movie before?”  
The keyboard was used to indicate “Yes” or “No.”  If a participant responded “Yes” they were 
asked the follow up question, “What was the name of the movie?”  No participants indicated 
having seen the movie before. 
   
 Data analysis 
 In this experiment, the focus of data analysis was on participant condition rather than 
whether a bomb-relevant inference was made, for reasons explained after the inference results 
are reported.  Inferences were coded by the same two research assistants as in Experiment 1 
using similar procedures.  For this experiment, the coding of the inference was dichotomous 
from the beginning (1 = participant mentioned something related to the bomb, 0 = the participant 
did not).  Again, the coders had a high level of inter-rater reliability, producing Cohen’s Kappa = 
.954, p < .001.  Any remaining discrepancies between the two coders were resolved through 
discussion.  After coding, the four participant groups were Context + Inference (n = 33), Context 
+ No-inference (n = 9), No-context + Inference (n = 1), and No-context + No-inference (n = 41).   
 
 Results 
 Predictive inference 
 A chi-square test was used to identify if there was a difference between the Context and 
No-context conditions.  As in Experiment 1, we found the expected large difference between 
context conditions, with 80% of participants in the Context condition making a bomb-relevant 
inference compared to only one participant from the No-context condition doing so (probably 
due to the “ticking” comment as in Experiment 1), X2 (1, N = 85) = 51.59, p < .001. 
These results indicate that participants had similar comprehension of the clips to 
participants in Experiment 1.  In Experiment 1, we also pointed out that those in the Context + 
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Audio condition were twice as likely as those in the Context + No-Audio condition to make the 
inference, which could be the result if half of the participants in the Context condition forgot 
about the bomb until being reminded by hearing the “ticking comment” near the end of the clip.  
If this reasoning is correct, then it calls into question comparing the eye-movements of those who 
did versus did not make the inference in the Context condition in the current experiment, because 
all participants had audio.  Specifically, for participants in the Context condition who made the 
inference, it is unknown whether their inference was based on their mental model having 
included the bomb from the beginning of the clip to the end, or instead based on suddenly 
remembering the bomb after hearing the “ticking noise” comment near the end of the clip.  We 
directly addressed this issue in Experiment 3, but for the current experiment eye-movement 
analyses focus on participant condition, Context versus No-context, rather than inference.  For 
comparison, analyses are included that removed participants in the Context condition who did 
not make the inference about the bomb. 
 
Eye-movements 
 Fixation durations and saccade lengths 
All eye-movement data were first cleaned by removing the longest and shortest 1 percent 
of fixation durations and saccade lengths for each participant.  We then compared the mean 
fixation durations and saccade lengths between the Context and No-context groups for the shared 
viewing period. There were no significant differences in fixation duration between the 2 
conditions.  In the Context condition the average fixation duration was 392 milliseconds (SD = 
65), and it was 386 (SD = 63) in the No-context condition (t (82) = .632, p = .529). The 
relationship held when only participants in the Context condition who made the inference were 
compared to the No-context condition (t (73) = .491, p = .625).  The average saccade length for 
the Context group was 4.84 of visual angle (SD = .63), and it was 4.63 (SD = .66) for the 
No-context group (t (82) = 1.848, p = .068, d = .41). When only Context condition participants 
who made the inference were included the effect of condition and inference on saccades lengths 
was significant (t (73) = 2.089, p = .040, d = .489). Thus, participants in the context condition 
who made the inference had longer saccade lengths (4.89 of visual angle; SD = .58) compared 
to the No-Context condition (4.63; SD = .66).  
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Longer saccade lengths usually show greater exploration of a scene (Pannasch, Helmert, 
Roth, Herbold, & Walter, 2008), which makes it surprising the Context group that made the 
inference would explore more. They have the best understanding of the narrative presented, and 
many of them maintained the bomb in their mental model throughout the clip. This should create 
suspense that would guide their eye-movements towards the car with the bomb, which should 
result in shorter saccade lengths. However, there is the possibility that due to their relatively 
good comprehension for the narrative Context participants were under less cognitive load to 
maintain the narrative, which gave them the opportunity to explore the screen more. This may be 
similar to a person watching a film for the second or third time, and noticing things they hadn’t 
in previous viewings because they don’t have to follow the narrative as closely.   
 
 Attentional synchrony 
Data pre-processing.  To calculate attentional synchrony the raw eye-tracking data was 
down sampled to 33Hz (from 1000 Hz) to express eye fixation X/Y coordinates per video frame, 
and exclude saccades and blinks.  Gaze was then visualized using CARPE (Computational and 
Algorithmic Representation and Processing of Eye-movements) software developed by Mital et 
al. (2010).  To identify whether the distribution of gaze differs between the two viewing 
conditions frame-by-frame we calculated the metric gaze similarity (Loschky et al., 2015; Mital 
et al., 2010), an adaptation of the Normalized Scanpath Saliency (NSS) first proposed by (Peters, 
Iyer, Itti, & Koch, 2005) and extended to video by Dorr et al. (2010) (for details of the method 
and equations, see Dorr et al. (2010)).  We modify the NSS method in two critical ways.  First, to 
calculate inter-observer similarity within the reference condition (in this case, Context), a 
probability map is created by plotting 2D circular Gaussians (1.2° SD % the fovea) around the 
gaze locations within a specific time window (225 ms; roughly equivalent to an average fixation) 
for all but one participant within the Context condition.  These Gaussians are summed and 
normalized relative to the mean and SD of these values across the entire Context condition, in 
order to see how the similarity fluctuates over time (z-score similarity = (raw values– mean) / 
SD).  The gaze location of the remaining participant is then sampled from this distribution (i.e., a 
Z-score is calculated for this participant) to identify how their gaze fits within the distribution at 
that moment.  This leave-one-out procedure is repeated for all participants within the Context 
condition until each participant has a z-scored value (referred to as gaze similarity here).  These 
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values express both 1) how each individual gaze location fits within the group at that moment 
and 2) how the average gaze similarity across all participants at that moment differs from other 
times in the video: A z-score close to zero indicates average synchrony, negative values indicate 
less synchrony than the mean (i.e., more variance), and positive values indicate more synchrony.   
Second, the method is extended to allow gaze from different viewing conditions (e.g., 
No-context) to be sampled from a reference distribution (Context).  For each gaze point in the 
No-context condition, the probability that it belongs to the Context condition’s distribution is 
identified by sampling the value at that location from the Context’s probability distribution (this 
time leave-one-out is not used as the gaze does not belong to the same distribution so cannot be 
sampled twice).  The resulting raw NSS values for No-context are then normalized to the 
reference condition.  Importantly, if the two distributions are identical, the average z-scored 
similarity for both distributions will fluctuate together, expressing more (positive z-score) or less 
(negative z-score) attentional synchrony over time (see Figs 3).  However, as the similarity score 
is derived from the reference distribution if the two distributions differ significantly we cannot 
know if this is because the comparison distribution has more or less attentional synchrony than 
the reference distribution.  We can only say that the comparison distribution differs more from 
the reference distribution than the reference distribution differs from itself.  For example, both 
gaze distributions could be tightly clustered but in different, non-overlapping parts of the screen 
or the comparison distribution could be more spread out and only partly overlap with the tight 
reference distribution.  Both situations would result in significant differences between the 
distributions.   
Additionally, a shuffled baseline was created to simulate random eye-movements during 
the clip.  The shuffled baseline started with the Context group.  Because the attentional 
synchrony values are calculated based on each participant’s gaze location on each film frame, the 
order of frames for each participant (and thus the order of their eye-movements across frames) 
was shuffled.  In other words, for the first frame of the film, instead of having each participants 
first fixation the shuffled baseline may have one participants first fixation, a second participants 
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th
 fixation, and another’s 22nd, etc.  This new gaze distribution was then compared to the 
reference distribution (i.e. Context) in the same method described above.  This created a chance 
baseline of gaze similarity specific to visible contents the film clip.   
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Attentional synchrony results.  The first gaze similarity analysis compared the Context 
and No-context conditions across the entirety of the film clip overlapping across conditions (2 
minutes and 54 seconds of film).  The upper section of Figure 3 illustrates the results of this 
comparison.  The lower section of Figure 3 shows fixation heat maps for three frames from the 
film clip that illustrate both high and low levels of gaze similarity in both the Context and No-
context conditions.   
 
 
 
Figure 3. Top: Similarity of gaze by context condition across the shared viewing period of the 
clip.  Gaze similarity is expressed as a z-score probability relative to the Context condition.  
(Context [Blue], No-context [Orange], and Shuffled Baseline [Black]).  Large values indicate 
greater attentional synchrony.  Bottom: Three of the peaks in gaze similarity are illustrated by 
image frames with superimposed heat maps of participant gaze location.  The frames show the 
gaze heat maps at the points indicated on the gaze similarity figure for both the context and No-
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context conditions.  Frames a) and c) show high gaze similarity, while frame b) shows low gaze 
similarity.  Note that Frame c) was the single highest level of attentional synchrony in the entire 
film clip. 
 
Qualitatively, looking at this figure one can see that gaze similarity scores for the Context and 
No-context groups generally vary together, indicating that regardless of context condition, 
viewers had the same patterns of attentional synchrony.  A t-test of mean gaze similarity by 
group supported this qualitative assessment (t (80) = 1.081, p = .283; d = 0.241), indicating that 
knowledge of the bomb did not have an effect on overall viewer attentional synchrony.  The 
results are similar with participants that did not make the inference in the Context condition are 
removed from the analysis (t (71) = .592, p = .556).  Next, the shuffled baseline is included for 
comparison.  As shown in figure 2, when the experimental groups’ gaze similarity is above the 
shuffled baseline, it indicates that the film is guiding eye-movements.  With the shuffled baseline 
included in an ANOVA, it is statistically significant (F (2, 122) = 73.727, p < .001, ηp2 = .551).  
Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons indicated that the shuffled baseline chance level of 
attentional synchrony (M = -.561, SD = .034) was significantly less than both the Context (M = -
.001, SD = .267) and No-context (M = -.067, SD = .290) conditions.   
 
 Region of interest 
Data pre-processing.  Dynamic regions of interest were created for the clip to test 
whether either condition looked more at the car with the bomb in it.  To create the dynamic 
region of interest for the car, we used Gazeatron (Smith & Mital, 2013; Vo et al., 2012) to 
identify the rectangular X and Y pixel coordinates for the car on the screen for each frame (at 30 
frames/sec).  These pixel coordinates were then exported and combined with the raw fixation 
report from EyeLink DataViewer (SR Research).  This was used to calculate the cumulative 
dwell time and mean number of fixations for each participant in the car region of interest.   
 
Region of interest results.  While gaze similarity is a metric that indicates the co-
occurrence of eye-movements in space and time, it does not indicate the features of a scene that 
are being attended to.  The region of interest analysis remedies this by indicating how much a 
specific object in a scene, here the car with the bomb in it, is attended to.  The Mental Model 
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Hypothesis predicted that the car with the bomb would be of greater importance to participants in 
the Context condition, because they are aware of the potential destructive causal effects the car 
could have on nearby persons, places, and things.   
As with the gaze similarity analysis, fixations on the car by viewers in the two context 
conditions were compared for the shared viewing time from the start time of the No-context 
condition when both conditions were seeing the exact same information.  The region of interest 
was used to calculate the mean number of fixations when the car was present on the screen 
within 30 frame (1 sec) time bins.  The upper portion of Figure 4 illustrates the results of this 
comparison.  The lower portion of Figure 4 shows fixation heat maps on two frames from the 
clip that illustrate high versus low rates of fixating the car region of interest in the Context and 
No-context conditions.   
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Figure 4. Top: Proportion of participants fixating the car by context condition throughout the 
film clip (3 second bins).  The higher the value the more participants looking at the car.  Bottom: 
Film stills show the region of interest for the frame, with fixation and heat maps superimposed.  
Still set a) shows a time point when the car was fixated by a majority of participants, and b) 
shows when the car was minimally fixated.
4
 Note that frame a) shows the single highest 
proportion of fixating the car region of interest, at the start of the common viewing period across 
both context conditions.   
 
As with the gaze similarity analyses, the lines for the two context conditions are mostly on top of 
one another, indicating that regardless of the context condition, participants seem to have fixated 
the car at the same time points throughout the clip.  A t-test comparing the proportion of 
fixations on the car for each condition was not statistically significant (t (82) = 1.73, p = .087; 
Cohen’s d = 0.382), but was trending in that direction.  The trend, however, was for the No-
                                                 
4
 Any apparent discrepancies between the proportion indicated and the number of fixations shown in the region of 
interest in the stills occur due to the binning across 30 frames used to create the data graph.   
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context group to have a higher proportion of fixations (M = .098, SD = .045) on the car than the 
Context group (M = .082, SD = .036), which is in the opposite direction of what was predicted.  
The result was the same when only those members of the context group who made the inference 
were included (t (73) = 1.434, p = .156; d = 0.316).  Overall, this indicates that the viewers 
without knowledge of the bomb fixated the car at a similar rate as those with knowledge of it.  A 
more targeted analysis was performed next to test whether there may be specific points where 
there are differences in the proportion of car fixations between the groups.   
  
 Latency to fixate the car after disocclusion 
Both the gaze similarity and region of interest analysis compared eye-movement 
variables across the entire video clip.  However, we felt those analyses may not have been 
sufficiently sensitive to find more subtle differences in eye-movements as a function of 
comprehension differences.  Thus, the next analysis was designed to identify potential 
differences at specific time points where the comprehension literature might predict differences.  
Interestingly, in the film clip, the car with the bomb comes in and out of view at various points, 
creating suspense for the viewer.  Thus, we tested whether, after the car had been out of view, 
when it came back into view (i.e., was disoccluded), if knowledge of the bomb would cause 
viewers to look back to the car more quickly.  To perform this analysis, 8 time points were 
identified during which the car was completely occluded from view.  This could be due to the car 
going off screen, driving behind occluding objects on the screen, or having objects on the screen 
moving in front of the car.  For these 8 instances, starting from the exact time point at which the 
car was again visible (disocclusion), a 3 second time window was created.  This time window 
was used to test the amount of time it took for participants to fixate the car after each 
disocclusion for each group.  If a participant did not refixate the car within the 3 second time 
window they were not included in the analysis for that occlusion.  For each disocclusion time 
point a t-test was performed.  Figure 5 shows the average latency to refixate the car after each 
disocclusion.  None of the eight disocclusions showed significant differences in the latency to 
refixate the car.  Disocclusions 1-6 and 8 had p’s > .05.  Disocclusion 7 only had three 
participants refixate the car in the 3 second time window, all of whom were in the No-context 
group, which meant the t-test could not be run.  Also, as seen in the figure, the group that fixated 
the car more quickly differed between disocclusions, and for four of the disocclusions fewer than 
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half of the participants fixated the car within the 3 second time window, producing unbalanced 
samples for each group.   
 
 
Figure 5. Time taken (with standard error bars) for participants to fixate the car after it became 
disoccluded (i.e., came back into view after having been out of view) as a function of context 
condition.   
 
The lack of measured differences in eye-movements due to the comprehension 
manipulation is similar to the results of the James Bond Moonraker study (Loschky et al., 2015).  
One simple reason for the similar results between Loschky et al. (2015) and this experiment 
could be that the Touch of Evil film clip did not reduce the overall attentional synchrony 
compared to the Moonraker clip.  Direct comparison between the participants in the two studies 
on measures such as gaze similarity is not possible.  This is because the clips have differences in 
features that could have an effect on the measures.  These differences include but are not limited 
to the aspect ratio of the clips, the resolution of the clips, and overall compositional differences.  
However, it is possible to descriptively compare the overall amount of gaze clustering between 
the 2 film clips.  Two statistics of gaze clustering were used for comparison; the sum weighted 
covariance and the number of clusters.  Both of these are statistics available from CARPE (Mital 
et al., 2010), the program used to process the data for the gaze similarity analyses.  The sum 
weighted covariance of gaze is calculated for each frame of each film for each participant 
condition.  The covariance measure is the sum of the covariances of the optimal number of 
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clusters used to describe the distribution of the gaze during each frame.  The “weighted” 
component of the measures indicates that the covariance measure gives more weight to clusters 
that are composed of more gaze points (see Mital et al. (2010) for more details).  This is 
essentially the amount of spread in gaze for each frame, while controlling for the number of 
clusters of gaze and how many participants are in each cluster.  The number of clusters statistic is 
the minimum number of regions in the frame that can best describe the distribution of all 
participants’ gaze.  Higher values for both measures indicate greater gaze dispersion, and thus 
lower attentional synchrony.  Figure 6 shows that both of these measures of gaze dispersion were 
higher for Touch of Evil, indicating that it produced lower attentional synchrony than the 
Moonraker clip.  Therefore, the motivation for choosing the Touch of Evil film clip was 
warranted, as it should have produced less tyranny of film than the Moonraker clip.  
Nevertheless, this stands in contrast to the lack of effect of strong comprehension differences on 
viewers’ eye-movements.   
 
 
Figure 6. a) Sum weighted covariance of gaze averaged over all frames.  Values indicate the 
amount of space occupied by gaze, with smaller values signifying tighter clustering of gaze, and 
higher values signifying greater gaze dispersion.  b) The average number of gaze clusters across 
all frames.   
 Discussion 
 In Experiment 2, the strong effect of the Context manipulation on comprehension from 
Experiment 1 was replicated.  However, Context had only one small effect on eye-movements.   
Saccade lengths were longer for participants in the Context condition that made the inference 
about the bomb. All other eye-movement measures showed no effect, including attentional 
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synchrony, the frequency of looking at the car with the bomb in it, or the latency to refixate the 
car after it came back into view (after being occluded).  These results therefore mostly support 
the tyranny of film hypothesis.  This is despite the fact that, as shown in Figure 6, the Touch of 
Evil film clip produced less gaze clustering than the Moonraker clip, as we had predicted due to 
the Touch of Evil clip lacking cuts and including numerous objects in the film frame to look at.  
Thus, despite having overall lower gaze clustering and what would appear to be a stronger 
manipulation of viewers’ comprehension than in the previous Moonraker study, viewers’ eye-
movements still did not reliably differ based on their understanding of the clip.  The greater 
amount of dispersion in Touch of Evil shown through the low gaze clustering does mean it is 
harder to find group differences in gaze similarity, because participants are exploring more of the 
screen.  However, the region of interest analysis should be more sensitive to potential location 
based eye-movement differences.   
 There are some potential problems with both our manipulation of comprehension and our 
measure of it in our first set of experiments.  First, as discussed earlier, in both Experiments 1 
and 2, a single participant in the No-context condition who heard audio was able to make a 
bomb-relevant inference without having seen the bomb at the beginning of the clip, or having 
seen the movie before.  We hypothesized that this was due the fact that, towards the end of the 
clip, a character in the car mentioned hearing a ticking noise, thus enabling those participants to 
guess that there was a bomb in the car, and so allowing them to generate a bomb-relevant 
inference a short time later when asked “what will happen next?”  Furthermore, we hypothesized 
that this would explain why twice as many viewers in the Context + Audio condition generated 
the inference compared to the Context + No-audio condition in Experiment 1.  Namely, the 
difference could be due to half of the viewers who made the inference in the Context + Audio 
condition having forgotten about the bomb and being reminded when they heard the ticking 
comment shortly before the clip ended.  This was the motivation for measuring working memory 
in the next experiment.  Since participants higher in working memory tend to have better 
narrative comprehension, it is predicted that participants with higher working memory will be 
more likely to make the bomb inference (i.e., less likely to forget about the bomb).  If roughly 
half of the Context condition participants end up forgetting about the bomb during the clip, but 
are then being reminded by the “ticking” comment near the end of the clip, then those viewers 
would not have maintained the bomb in their mental model throughout the three minute clip, and 
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so their eye-movements should be more similar to participants in the No-context condition.  
Therefore, if roughly half of the participants in the Context condition were likely to have 
forgotten about the bomb, this could potentially explain the lack of effect of Context condition 
on eye-movements in Experiment 2.  To remove the statistical noise in the inference data 
potentially introduced by the “ticking” comment, all audio was removed from the second set of 
experiments.  Thus, participants that make the bomb related inference at the end of the clip will 
need to have maintained it in their mental model throughout the duration of the clip.  
An additional potential problem with the first set of experiments was that the No-context 
condition and the Context condition both show the car at the beginning of the scene, and in 
particular a couple getting into the car.  First mentioned entities have a special status in mental 
models for narratives (e.g., Gernsbacher, 1990).  As such, the car was likely prominent in the 
mental models for both the Context and No-context conditions, which may have led to similar 
eye-movements in both conditions, regardless of whether they had knowledge of the bomb.   
Finally, a third and more general problem is that our measure of comprehension, namely 
whether or not a viewer generated a bomb-relevant predictive inference at the end of the clip, 
was unidimensional.  It is possible that such a measure, taken after the viewers’ have finished 
watching the film clip and their eye-movements recorded, overestimates the differences in 
viewers’ comprehension, or perhaps the predictive inference measure is simply insensitive to 
comprehension processes that affect eye-movements.  This suggests that other richer measures of 
comprehension may be needed to find comprehension effects on film viewers’ eye-movements. 
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Chapter 4 - Experiment 3: Event Segmentation and Working Memory with New 
No-Context Condition 
The second set of experiments (Experiments 3 & 4) were designed to deal with all of the 
potential reasons the first set of experiments found minimal differences in eye-movements 
despite the context manipulation.  The experimental changes were both in terms of the context 
manipulations and the comprehension measures.   
 
 Context manipulations 
To address the potential problem that viewers in the Context condition may forget about 
the bomb until they hear the “ticking comment” near the end of the clip, but then subsequently 
report a bomb-relevant predictive inference, the clip was shown without audio.  With this 
manipulation only viewers in the Context condition who maintain the bomb and its potential 
destructive causal implications in their mental model throughout the clip should draw a bomb-
relevant inference at the end.  Conversely, those viewers who forget about the bomb while 
watching the clip should not be reminded by the “ticking comment” near the end of the clip, 
since it is only in the audio, and should therefore not draw a bomb-relevant predictive inference.  
This should produce a stronger difference in the mental models of those participants who draw 
the inference in the Context condition, and those who did not, particularly in the No-context 
condition.   
 Furthermore, in order to address the potential issue that viewers in the No-context 
condition may have treated the characters in the car as protagonists, and therefore paid close 
attention to the car even though they did not know it contained a bomb, a new No-context 
condition was used.  In the new No-context condition, viewers began watching the clip only after 
the walking couple entered the street and the car was off-screen (Figure 1; Image 5 marked “No-
context: Exp.  3 & 4”).  Thus, viewers in the new No-context condition should treat the walking 
couple as the protagonists.  Viewers in the Context condition started watching the clip from the 
beginning as before.   
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 Comprehension measures 
 In the first set of experiments the only comprehension measure used was predictive 
inference generation, which focuses on high-level comprehension relatively globally at the end 
of the clip.  On the other hand, eye-movements are an on-line measure of attention.  Experiment 
3 therefore used event segmentation as an on-line comprehension measure throughout the entire 
film clip (Newtson, 1973; Zacks, Speer, & Reynolds, 2009).  Event segmentation involves 
having participants press a button any time they perceive a new event occurring.  Importantly, 
however, eye-movement and event segmentation measures were not run simultaneously, as the 
manual task of pressing a button for event segmentation will likely have an effect on eye-
movements (Eisenberg & Zacks, 2016).  However, it has been demonstrated that event 
segmentation is a naturally occurring process that aids comprehension (Hard, Tversky, & Lang, 
2006; Zacks & Tversky, 2001), and that participants commonly show high inter-subject and test-
retest reliability (Newtson, 1973; Speer, Swallow, & Zacks, 2003; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, & 
Maley, 2010). 
 Additionally, in the previous experiments it was shown that roughly half of the 
participants in the Context condition who see the bomb do not end up making a bomb-relevant 
predictive inference at the end of the film clip.  In an attempt to explain this, participants in 
Experiment 3 completed a series of working memory measures: operation span (OPSAN, Turner 
& Engle, 1989) reading span (RSPAN, Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), and counting span 
(CSPAN, Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982).  Reading and comprehension research has shown 
that working memory span is an individual difference that predicts comprehension abilities such 
as making predictive inferences (Allbritton, 2004; Calvo, 2001, 2005; Daneman & Carpenter, 
1980; Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Linderholm, 2002; Rai et al., 2014; 
Rai et al., 2011; St George et al., 1997).  Although there are different processes that contribute to 
comprehension in reading and visual narratives, there should also be overlapping comprehension 
processes (Loughlin & Alexander, 2012; Magliano et al., 2013).  Based on this, we predicted that 
participants in the Context condition with higher working memory scores would be more likely 
to make a bomb-relevant inference than those in the Context condition with lower working 
memory scores.   
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 Method 
 Participants 
A total of 81 students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Kansas State 
University participated in Experiment 3 for course research credit, and were pseudo-randomly 
assigned to either the Context condition (n = 41) or the No-context condition (n = 40).  
Participants took the FrACT visual acuity test (Bach, 2006), and all had 20/30 or better corrected 
or uncorrected vision.  Only participants who had previously participated a working memory 
study with the OSPAN, RSPAN, and CSPAN were given the possibility of signing up to 
participate in this experiment.  Despite this, working memory scores were only available for 31 
participants in the Context condition, due to participants either not completing the working 
memory study or issues of matching participants between the two studies.   
 
 Stimuli 
The same opening scene from Touch of Evil was used in Experiment 3, but no audio was 
presented with the clip.  The clip used for the Context condition was identical to that used in 
Experiments 1 and 2.  The new No-context condition saw a different version of the clip that 
started 1 minute and 49 seconds into the opening scene, at a point when the walking couple was 
shown alone on the screen, with the car off-screen.   
Participants viewed the clip in groups of up to four.  Each participant viewed the clip on 
an individual 17 inch Samsung SyncMaster 957 MBS monitor, with a chin rest used to maintain 
a constant viewing distance of 53.34 cm, a visual angle of 27.06° x 18.18°, and an image 
resolution of 1080 x 720 pixels.  The monitors were set to refresh at 60Hz, to ensure there were 
no dropped frames with the video playing at 30 frames per second. 
 
 Procedure 
To learn the process of event segmentation participants were first given practice with the 
task using an example 83 second video of a person folding laundry.  They were instructed to 
press a button whenever they perceived “new” events that were “natural” and “meaningful.” 
After the practice video the instructions were repeated, and participants were able to begin the 
experimental video clip by pressing a button.  As in Experiments 1 and 2, once the video was 
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complete, participants were asked, “What will happen next?” This was followed by a question of 
whether they had seen the film before, and, if so, what its name was.  Two participants were 
removed from the analysis because they had seen the clip before. 
 
 Results 
 Predictive inference 
The inference coding in this experiment followed the same procedure as the previous 
two.  Two coders independently identified the predictive inference participants made as either 
relating to the bomb, or not.  The inter-rater reliability was high (Kappa = .962, p < .001).  
Remaining discrepancies between the two coders were resolved through discussion (there was 
only one inference in this experiment that needed discussion). 
A chi-square analysis showed that, as before, participants in the Context-condition were 
far more likely to make the predictive inference about the bomb than participants in the No-
context condition (X
2
 (1, N = 82) = 18.932, p < .001).  Thus, the jumped-in-the-middle Context 
manipulation again strongly affected participant’s mental model of the film clip, as measured by 
the predictive inference task.   
 
Working memory and inference generation.  To test whether participants with better 
working memory scores were more likely to make a bomb-relevant predictive inference, a t-test 
compared working memory scores for those participants in the Context condition who did or did 
not make the inference.  Of the 41 participants in the Context condition, only 31 had completed 
all components of the working memory experiment and could be matched up to their results in 
the event segmentation experiment (12 participants in the group of 31 made the inference).  As 
shown in Figure 7 the composite working memory score across all three measures showed a 
main effect of working memory on inference generation (t (29) = 2.310, p = .028, d = .918).  
Participants that made an inference about the bomb recalled proportionately more working 
memory items (.84, SD = .08) than those participants that did not make the inference (.71, SD = 
.19).  For the individual working memory measures, the CSPAN had the largest effect size (t 
(29) = -2.320, p = .028, d = .983) and highest overall performance for both groups (Inference 
Mean = .92, SD = .05; No-Inference Mean = .78, SD = .19), the OSPAN was in the middle (t 
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(29) = 2.010, p = .054, d = .776) with Inference group performance at .79 (SD = .15) and the No-
Inference group at .63 (SD = .23),and the RSPAN had the lowest (t (29) = 1.763, p = .089, d = 
.703) with inference group performance at .83 (SD = .08) and No-Inference group performance 
at .71 (SD = .21).  Therefore, it seems that despite differences among the three working memory 
measures, the relationship between working memory and inference generation from the film clip 
is stable.  Thus, our predictive inference measure of high-level film comprehension shows the 
same sort of relationship to working memory as has been shown in previous studies of inference 
generation in reading comprehension (Allbritton, 2004; Calvo, 2001, 2005; Daneman & 
Carpenter, 1980; Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Linderholm, 2002; Rai et 
al., 2014; Rai et al., 2011; St George et al., 1997), lending support to the idea that the predictive 
inference measure is indeed measuring film comprehension processes.   
 
 
 
Figure 7. Proportion of working memory items recalled accurately (with standard error bars) for 
all working memory measures by presence/absence of bomb inference. 
 
 Event segmentation 
Proportion of events.  To test for a general difference in event segmentation throughout 
the portion of the clip that both conditions saw, the proportion of participants who identified 
events within 3 second bins was calculated.  This first analysis tested whether there was a 
35 
difference in the proportion of events identified by the Context conditions from the first 
appearance of the walking couple to the point they kiss at the very end of the clip.  For this 
analysis the clip was first divided into three second bins.  Next, for each participant, it was 
calculated whether they pressed their button to identify an event for each of the bins.  This gave 
an overall distribution of when events were identified by each participant throughout the film 
clip, and then these were aggregated to give an overall group distribution for events in the clip.  
No-context participants indicated a significantly higher proportion of events (No-context = .32) 
than those in the Context condition (Context = .20)(X
2
 (1, N = 44) = 44.00, p = .021; Eta = .350) 
(Figure 8).  This provides converging evidence, here measured in an on-line task, that the context 
manipulation creates differences in film comprehension, with the Context participants generating 
fewer boundaries than the No-context group.  The fact that the Context group identified fewer 
boundaries may appear counterintuitive since they have a better understanding for the narrative.  
One explanation for this is that better understanding should allow for better prediction of 
upcoming events, and event segmentation typically occurs when there is an error in the 
prediction of an event (Reynolds, Zacks, & Braver, 2007).  Alternatively, the No-context group 
may identify more events because they are tracking more events occurring outside of the primary 
narrative about the bomb (e.g., the introduction of new characters and events that are irrelevant 
to the bomb narrative). 
Additionally, since those with higher working memory showed a greater probability of 
making the inference for those in the Context group, the role of working memory on 
segmentation rate was also tested using regression with the same Context group participants.  
Drawing from the previous result, it was expected that those higher in working memory who had 
better comprehension would identify fewer events overall.  This is because having higher 
working memory capacity may require less mental model updating.  The working memory 
composite was entered as a predictor of the proportion of events overall.  No relationship was 
found between working memory and the proportion of events identified (B = -8.07, R
2
 = .068, F 
(1, 27) = 1.977, p = .171), although the relationship trended in the predicted direction of 
participants with higher working memory identifying fewer events.  
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Figure 8. Proportion of new events indicated within 3 second bins by context condition. 
 
Proportion of events: First appearance of car. The new No-context condition was 
intended to create differences in the perceived protagonists based on which entities were seen 
first.  Thus, for the new No-context condition, the first appearance of the car should be a critical 
viewing period in which the car is added the mental model.  In the Context condition, 
participants already know about the car and where it is, and should be more likely to predict it 
will reappear where it does.  To test this hypothesis, we created an 8 second time period, which 
began when the car first appeared on the screen for the new No-context condition, and ended 
when the car was occluded (as described in Experiment 2, Latency to Fixate the Car after 
Disocclusion).  We then calculated the proportion of events perceived during that 8 second 
period in each context condition, and found similar results to those for the entire shared viewing 
period. Participants in the No-context condition indicated a significantly higher proportion of 
events (No-context = .0536) than those in the Context condition (Context = .0397) (X
2
 (1, N = 
13) = 13.00, p = .043, Eta = .303), though the overall rate of event perception during the 8 
second period was relatively low for both groups. 
 
Segmentation agreement.  An alternative method of scoring the event segmentation data 
is in terms of the proportion of segmentation differences, which allows us to ask whether there 
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are differences in where participants segment throughout the clip.  For this, we used  Zacks’ 
(1999) segmentation agreement scoring method.  This analysis marks events within one second 
bins and creates a segmentation baseline that each participant is compared to create an agreement 
score for each participant in the form of a scaled correlation.   
The first agreement analysis used all participants to create an overall event structure for 
the shared viewing portion of the clip.  In this analysis, we compared each condition against all 
other viewers, to determine whether there were general similarities in event segmentation across 
groups.  When comparing the scaled correlations for each participant, we did not find significant 
differences in agreement scores between the Context (.515) and No-context (.526) conditions, (t 
(76) = -.308, p = .759; d = .071).  This indicates that at a gross level, both groups had a similar 
level of agreement, but it does not take into account the potentially different event structures for 
both groups.    
Our second agreement analysis mirrored the gaze similarity eye-movement analysis by 
comparing both groups to a baseline set by the Context condition.  In other words, the first 
agreement analysis used all participants to create the comparison group regardless of condition.  
The second analysis only used the comprehension group to create the comparison group.  This 
allowed for a test of whether the No-context group’s event structure was significantly different 
from the Context group.  For this, we first calculated the event structure identified by the Context 
condition, and then individually compared the Context and No-context condition participants to 
the Context condition.  Using the Context group as the comparison group, a t-test of the scaled 
agreement scores showed a main effect of Context on event segmentation agreement (t (76) = 
2.898, p = .005; d = .664).  This indicates that there were differences in where Context and No-
context participants identified events within the shared viewing period of the clip.  This, again, 
provides converging evidence of on-line differences in comprehension as a function of context 
condition
5
. 
Lastly, the relationship of working memory and segmentation agreement was tested 
based on the known relationship of working memory and comprehension (Daneman & Merikle, 
1996).  High segmentation agreement typically indicates better comprehension (Zacks et al., 
                                                 
5
 The agreement analysis could not be run for the first appearance of the car for the No-context group. The 8 second 
viewing period did not have enough events identified in either condition to allow for a reliable event structure to be 
created for statistical comparison. 
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2009; Zacks & Tversky, 2001), thus it is expected that those high in working memory should 
also show greater agreement.  The working memory composite was entered as a predictor of 
segmentation agreement.  No relationship was found between working memory and 
segmentation agreement (B =.01, R
2
 = .0002, F (1, 27) = .006, p = .937).  It is somewhat 
surprising that there is not an effect of working memory on segmentation agreement, because it 
is thought that segmentation is directly related to the updating of information in working memory 
(Kurby & Zacks, 2008).  Although, the lack of the difference could be similar to the reasoning 
for the null effect of eye-movements, which is that although certain participants forget about the 
bomb they still follow the actions of the same characters and events. 
 
 Discussion 
Experiment 3 had two primary goals.  First, it was designed to address the concern from 
Experiments 1 and 2 that the predictive inference might not have adequately measured 
comprehension at the end of the clip.  To the extent that we have not been adequately measuring 
comprehension, it could explain the lack of effects of comprehension on eye-movements.  For 
this reason, we used the event segmentation task as a qualitatively different on-line measure of 
film comprehension.  The event segmentation results showed that the context manipulation 
resulted in participants identifying events at different points throughout the film clip, and the No-
context group was more likely to identify events throughout.  These results indicate that the new 
No-context manipulation had the type of effects on comprehension that we would expect, 
providing converging evidence for the validity of our comprehension manipulation.   
The second goal was to help explain the fact that roughly half of the participants in the 
Context condition failed to generate a bomb-relevant predictive inference.  It seems surprising 
that so many viewers in the Context condition would fail to draw bomb-relevant inferences at the 
end of the clip, despite the bomb’s central importance to the narrative in the opening shot of the 
film.  We therefore tested the hypothesis that viewers in the Context condition with lower 
working memory would be less likely to generate a bomb-relevant inference at the end of the 
clip, and found evidence strongly consistent with it.  We suspect that this result was due to the 
fact that after first seeing the bomb at the beginning of the clip, there were no further cues to the 
existence of the bomb throughout the remainder of the opening shot, particularly after the 
exclusion of the audio track, which included the “ticking comment” near the end of the clip.  
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Thus, viewers with lower working memory would have a harder time maintaining the bomb in 
their mental model of the narrative in the face of other competing salient narrative events (e.g., 
the introduction of other locations, characters, and their actions).  By showing that working 
memory limitations were strongly related to the process of drawing the target predictive 
inference at the end of the clip in the Context condition, it connects our results to established 
theoretical explanations of higher-order processes in reading comprehension, and thus lends 
credence to our claims to be validly measuring comprehension of the film clip through use of the 
predictive inference task.  It also provides a richer description of viewers’ comprehension 
processes involved in understanding the particular film clip used in our study.  Finally, to our 
knowledge, this study is the first to have extended the working memory span to inference 
generation findings from the realm of reading comprehension to visual narrative comprehension 
(but see Magliano, Larson, Higgs, & Loschky, 2015). 
Finally, the role of working memory in event segmentation frequency and agreement was 
tested.  The two main reasons for this were that segmentation of events is thought to occur at the 
updating of event model information in working memory (Zacks et al., 2009; Zacks & Tversky, 
2001), and working memory in general has been shown have a relationship with comprehension 
processes (Allbritton, 2004; Calvo, 2001, 2005; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Daneman & 
Merikle, 1996; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Linderholm, 2002; Rai et al., 2014; Rai et al., 2011; St 
George et al., 1997).  Despite this, no effect of working memory on event segmentation was 
found.   
The large number of effects of the manipulation of comprehension motivates a new eye-
tracking experiment in a number of ways.  Foremost, the effects show that the new No-context 
condition and the removal of audio are creating clear distinctions between the mental models for 
each condition as measured by inference generation, and this measure has less noise due to the 
removal of the “ticking” comment.  Additionally, the event segmentation is showing online 
effects of the manipulation, which may indicate that there should also be an effect on the online 
measure of eye-movements. 
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Chapter 5 - Experiments 4a and 4b: Eye-Tracking with New No-context Condition 
and Map Task 
Having created the new No-context condition, and establishing that it created strong 
effects on comprehension of the film clip in Experiment 3, we carried out Experiments 4a and 
4b.  Experiment 4a was designed to determine what effects, if any, the new No-context condition 
would have on eye-movements.  Experiment 4b introduced a new condition to test for the effect 
of task on comprehension and eye-movements.   
 
 Experiment 4a 
 Method 
 Participants 
Data was collected from 201 students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at 
Kansas State University for course research credit.  Data from 8 participants were dropped 
because of program errors during data collection, for not completing the questions at the end of 
the experiment, or for having participated in an earlier experiment using Touch of Evil.  Data 
from the remaining 193 participants (Age: M = 19.5, female = 59.2%) were included in the 
analyses.  Participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to either the Context condition (n = 131) 
or the new No-context condition (n = 62 participants) with the constraint that we have roughly 
twice as many participants in the Context condition, based on the assumption (from Experiments 
1-3) that roughly 50% of them would fail to generate a bomb-relevant predictive inference at the 
end of the film clip.   
 
 Stimuli 
The video stimuli used in this experiment were the same as those used in Experiment 3, 
namely all video clips were presented with No-Audio.  As in Experiment 2, stimuli were 
presented on a 17” ViewSonic Graphics Series CRT monitor (Model G90fb), and using a chin 
and forehead rest, there was a fixed viewing distance of 60.96 cm.  The screen subtended 21.42° 
x 16.10° of visual angle. 
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 Procedure 
Experiment 4a’s procedures were identical to those of Experiment 2 with the exception of 
the above-noted changes to the No-context condition, and the lack of audio in the film clip.   
 
 Data analysis 
The procedure for predictive inference coding was identical to Experiment 1, and was   
carried out by the same two research assistants.  Once the research assistants had coded each 
participant response, inter-rater reliability was tested, and shown to be high using Cohen’s 
Kappa = .954, p < .001.  Any remaining discrepancies between the two coders were resolved 
through discussion such that each response was coded either as ‘0’ or ‘1.’  
 
 Results 
 Predictive inference 
Inference coding was used for two purposes in this experiment.  First, for participants in 
the Context condition, it allowed us to do analyses based on comprehension.  Second, it allowed 
us to exclude any participants in the No-context condition that made the predictive inference 
about the bomb.  The procedure here was the same as in the previous 3 experiments.  Overall, we 
replicated the results of the previous experiments with the Context condition more likely to make 
a bomb-relevant inference (X
2
 (1, N = 193) = 46.39, p < .001) (Eta = .490).  Almost exactly half 
of the participants in the Context condition made a bomb-relevant inference (65 participants 
made the inference and 66 did not), consistent with Experiments 1-3.  No participants in the No-
context condition made the inference.  Thus, data in all the following analyses are in terms of 
three groups: the Context participants that made the inference (Context + Inference), the Context 
participants that did not make the inference (Context + No-inference), and the No-context group 
(none of whom made the inference).   
 
Eye-movements 
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 Fixation durations and saccade lengths 
Data cleaning followed the same procedure as Experiment 2.  The effects were reversed 
when compared to Experiment 2.  There was an effect of group on fixation duration (F (2, 191) = 
3.79, p = .024, ηp2 = .038). Tukey HSD post hoc comparisons indicated that the Context + 
Inference group had the shortest average duration of 367 ms (SD = 57 ms), which was 
significantly shorter (p = .026) than the No-context group at 398 ms (SD = 82 ms). The Context 
+ No-inference group was not different from either of the other groups (378 ms; SD = 70 ms).  
There were no differences in average saccade length (F (2, 191) = .905, p = .406). The Context + 
Inference group averaged 4.89 of visual angle (SD = .61), for the Context + No-inference 
group it was 4.65 (SD = .74), and for the No-context group it was 4.69 of visual angle (SD = 
.82).  
Shorter fixation durations for the Context group that made the inference match the 
relationship between fixation durations and comprehension during reading. Specifically, fixation 
durations tend to be shorter when a person has a better understanding for what they are reading 
(Rayner, 1998). In the current experiment participants in the Context condition that made the 
inference show a high level of comprehension for the narrative and shorter fixation durations. 
Further exploration is needed to identify why in Experiment 2 there was a medium sized effect of 
context on saccade lengths, and then a medium size effect on fixation durations in Experiment 4.  
Either the use of the new No-context or the removal of the audio track could have made the 
saccade length effect smaller for Experiment 4, and created the fixation duration effect.    
 
 Attentional synchrony 
To perform the analyses for Experiment 3 the same data pre-processing that was 
employed in Experiment 2 was used.  CARPE (Mital et al., 2010) was used to down sample the 
raw eye-movement data.  After processing this data, a reference probability distribution was 
calculated for the Context with inference group.  The eye-movement data for each participant in 
each group were then compared to the reference distribution to calculate the gaze similarity 
between groups. 
As with Experiment 2, the first run was an omnibus test for gaze differences across the 
viewing of the critical portion of the film clip (the same 1 minute and 49 seconds of the clip that 
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both groups saw).  During this critical portion of the clip, there were no group differences (F (2, 
190) = 0.05, p = .955).  As in Experiment 2, Figure 9  shows that the lines indicating gaze 
similarity for each group are nearly identical, indicating that the tendency for viewers to look at 
the same places at the same times was the same across groups.  Again, a shuffled baseline was 
included for comparison for the shared viewing period.  Overall, the gaze similarity of all three 
experimental groups’ was generally above the shuffled baseline, indicating that the film was 
guiding eye-movements, creating the tyranny of film.  Including the shuffled baseline in the 
ANOVA was statistically significant (F (3, 254) = 55.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .395), with all 
experimental groups higher than the baseline. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Similarity of gaze by context condition across the shared viewing period of the clip that 
starts on frame 2519.  Gaze similarity is expressed as a z-score probability relative to the context 
condition and inference made (Context + Inference [Blue], Context + No-Inference [Green], No-
context [Orange], and Shuffled Baseline [Black]).  Larger values indicate greater attentional 
synchrony.  The shuffled baseline indicates chance level gaze similarity for the clip. 
 
What these results indicate is that viewers’ understanding of the clip did not influence 
their attentional synchrony.  Even when viewers knew about the bomb or thought the car and the 
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couple in it were the main characters of the film clip, they viewed the clip similarly to viewers 
who did not.  However, we cannot explain this lack of differences between groups in terms of the 
film clip failing to guide eye-movements since overall gaze similarity was clearly well above 
chance for all three groups.   
 
 Region of interest 
The same region of interest data pre-processing as in Experiment 2 was used.  The car 
was identified as the region of interest, and we tested whether our three viewing groups 
differentially looked at it.  The region of interest analyses again started using the entire shared 
viewing period, and then a predetermined time point of interest based on the manipulation of 
protagonist.   
The omnibus region of interest analysis started the first time the car appeared on the 
screen in the No-context condition, 1 minute and 57 seconds into the film clip.  Overall, there 
were no significant differences between the three groups in how often they fixated the car during 
this viewing period (F (2, 190) = 1.07, p = .345) (Figure 10).  This is in line with the gaze 
similarity analysis, indicating that the manipulation of both knowledge of the bomb and the 
protagonists had no effect on viewers’ overall likelihood of looking at the car.   
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Figure 10. Proportion of participants fixating the car by context condition and inference 
throughout the film clip (Context + Inference [Blue], Context + No-Inference [Green], and No-
context + No-Inference [Orange]).  The higher the value the more participants looking at the car.  
First appearance of car for No-context group marked with dotted lines. 
 
We next carried out a more specific region of interest analysis to probe a critical time 
period when the manipulation of protagonist might be expected to have an effect on fixations of 
the car.  This time period was the same 8 second period used in the event segmentation analysis 
when the car with the bomb was first seen by participants in the No-context condition.  At that 
point in the narrative, the walking couple walks past the car, which is not moving because a 
crowd of pedestrians has blocked the street.  For viewers in the No-context condition, the car 
should have no particular importance, but for viewers in the Context condition, it should already 
be an integral component of their mental model, regardless of whether the bomb is still active in 
their mental model or not.  Thus, in line with the “eye-mind hypothesis” (Just & Carpenter, 
1980; Reichle et al., 1998; Reilly & Radach, 2006), the mental model hypothesis would predict 
that the Context condition viewers would be more likely to look at the car than the No-context 
condition, at least initially.  To test this prediction, we created an 8 second time window from 
when the car first appeared (frame 2758) and right before it was briefly occluded from view 
again (frame 3028), and we then measured the proportion of fixations of the car for each group.  
A one-way (Group: Context + Inference vs.  Context + No-inference vs.  No-context) between 
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subjects ANOVA found a main effect of viewing group on proportion of fixations on the car 
during the pre-specified 8 second time window (F (2, 190) = 3.93, p = .021, ηp2 = .04).  As 
illustrated in Figure 10, the Tukey HSD procedure indicated that viewers in the No-context 
group were significantly less likely to fixate the car (M = .054, SD = .078),  than those in the 
Context + Inference group (M = .098, SD = .086) (p = .02).  There was also a non-significant 
trend (p = .06) for viewers in the Context + No-inference group to fixate the car less than viewers 
in the Context + Inference group (M = .093, SD = .122).  This provided the first support for the 
influence of the mental model on predictable gaze behavior in the Touch of Evil film clip.  
Viewers who knew about the bomb and already had the car in their mental model were more 
likely to fixate the car during its first appearance within the critical period than participants who 
had not indexed the car (and the couple in it) as important agents in the narrative.  We will refer 
to this as evidence of the agent effect, as it seems to be due to whether viewers treat an entity in 
the narrative as an “agent” or not. 
In general, experiment 4a showed support for the tyranny of film with there being no 
overall differences in gaze distribution across the difference inference conditions.  The fixation 
duration effect may indicate that Context + inference participants are under less cognitive load 
than No-context participants, which is consistent with what is expected for participants with 
better comprehension (Rayner, 1998).  The agency effect, reported for the ROI analysis 
demonstrates the potential for gaze to be influenced by an object’s relevance to the viewer’s 
mental model, but the fleeting nature of this effect suggests that the motivation for such top-
down control may need to be stronger and more deliberate during film viewing than has been 
demonstrated in static scene viewing (DeAngelus & Pelz, 2009; Smith & Mital, 2013; Yarbus, 
1967) due to the bottom-up tyranny of film.  With this overall lack of an effect, Experiment 4b 
was conducted to test whether it was possible to get a strong effect with our stimuli and 
measures.  This tests whether the previous experiments are showing a true lack of an overall 
effect of comprehension on eye-movements, or if there may be a problem with our stimuli or 
measures.   
 
 Experiment 4b: Map Task  
In Experiments 2 and 4a, we found that participants who view the clip with different 
understandings show surprisingly few eye-movement differences, which generally supports the 
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tyranny of film hypothesis.  This suggests that differences in narrative comprehension during 
film viewing have little effect of visual attention.  This may be due to differences in 
comprehension not creating differences in the objects of interest in the narrative similar to Taya 
et al. (2012).  However, previous work has shown higher level cognition has large, online effects 
on eye-movements during scene viewing.  Classic work on eye-movements in static scenes has 
shown cognitive effects of viewing task on eye-movements, such as looking at a picture and 
trying to determine what the people’s ages are, or how wealthy they are (DeAngelus & Pelz, 
2009; Yarbus, 1967) and more recent studies comparing, for example, scene memory versus 
object search tasks (Foulsham & Underwood, 2007; Henderson, Brockmole, Castelhano, & 
Mack, 2007; Henderson, Shinkareva, Wang, Luke, & Olejarczyk, 2013).  These effects have also 
been shown more recently in natural film (i.e., unedited real-world video) such as trying to 
determine the location depicted in a video (Smith & Mital, 2013) and edited narrative film 
(Lahnakoski et al., 2014).  The latter study showed viewers a clip from “Desperate Housewives” 
twice, and for each viewing manipulated participants’ cognitive perspective, either that of a 
detective or of an interior decorator.  We consider adopting such a cognitive perspective to be a 
viewing task manipulation.
6
  The Lahnakoski et al. (2014) results showed that when adopting the 
detective perspective, viewers looked at the main characters more (in the center of the screen, 
making shorter saccades), but when adopting the interior decorator perspective, they looked at 
the background setting more (on the edges of the screen, making longer saccades).  Interestingly, 
after the experiment, some participants mentioned that when they adopted the interior decorator 
perspective, they had avoided looking at the main characters, and ignored what they were saying, 
presumably because the main characters were task-irrelevant.  Thus, the effects of adopting the 
interior decorator perspective, which changed viewer’s eye-movements while watching the video 
clip, seemed to be at odds with the default implicit task of understanding the narrative (which 
was probably much closer to the detective perspective, given that the main characters were 
discussing a murder).   
                                                 
6
 Indeed, the participants were told that each perspective was defined in terms of tasks, such as, among other things, 
for the detective perspective, “Your task is to evaluate which persons act suspiciously and could be potential 
suspects for murder,” and for the interior decorator perspective, “Your task is to evaluate how you could improve 
the interiors and exteriors you see in order to make them more comfortable” (Lahnakoski et al., 2014, p. 324). 
48 
We therefore predicted viewer eye-movements in the Touch of Evil clip would similarly 
be affected by a cognitive task that was designed to be specifically at odds with understanding 
the narrative.  We chose a modified version of the spot-the-location task from Smith and Mital 
(2013).  Participants were instructed to “draw a map of the area depicted from memory” after 
viewing the film clip, “including naming and labeling as many locations as possible” (Full 
Instructions in Appendix A).  We very carefully avoided explicitly instructing viewers where to 
look, but instead worded the instructions such that it left it up to the viewers to decide how to 
accomplish the task, including decisions on where to look.  Nevertheless, we expected that the 
task would encourage viewers to look at the background locations (e.g., stores and their signs) in 
order draw a detailed map with labels.  Therefore, as with the Lahnakoski et al. (2014) interior 
decorator perspective task, we expected that, compared to viewers in the Context condition of the 
previous experiments, viewers in the Map Task condition would be more likely to look at the 
periphery of the scene, and make correspondingly longer saccades to do so.  We also expected 
that, compared to viewers in the Context condition, viewers in the Map Task condition would 
look less at the car, because they would be looking more at the buildings and signs.  Likewise, 
we expected that, because viewers in the Map Task condition would be looking at different 
things than viewers in the Context condition, we would find reduced gaze similarity between 
Context condition viewers and Map Task viewers. 
Note that all of these predicted effects of higher level cognition on eye-movements while 
watching the Touch of Evil film clip would be evidence of breaking the tyranny of 
film.  Nevertheless, we also expected that such effects of the Map Task would not necessarily be 
overwhelming, and that viewers of the film clip would still be drawn to look at many of the same 
things at the same time as viewers in Experiments 2 & 4, for the reason that our knowledge of 
the film clip suggested that some parts of it lacked much background detail to look at (e.g., the 
medium shot of the couple kissing at the end of the clip shown in Figure 1).  Thus, we expected a 
reduction in the tyranny of film but not a complete elimination of it.  Finally, we also predicted 
that the Map Task would lead to a reduction in understanding the film clip at the level of the 
event model, with a corresponding decrease in the proportion of participants who would make 
the critical inference regarding the bomb in the car, because the Map Task viewers’ attention 
would frequently not be on information important to the narrative, but rather on information in 
the background.   
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 Method 
 Participants 
Data was collected from an additional 75 participants.  For this additional experimental 
condition, a priori criteria were created to select which participants would be included in 
analyses.  First, the Gardony Map Analyzer was used to score participant’s maps for accuracy 
(Gardony, Taylor, & Brunyé, 2015), and only participants with scores greater than or equal to the 
median were included in any of the analyses (see data analysis section for specifics on the 
Gardony Map Analyzer.  See appendix B for example maps with scores.).  Second, only 
participants that did not make the inference about the bomb at the end of the clip were included 
in the eye-movement analyses.  This is because one purpose of the Map Task was to make the 
narrative irrelevant, and participants able to make the inference about the bomb must have 
attended to the narrative.  This resulted in a total of 37 comparison group participants being 
included in eye-movement data analyses.  Future analyses may look at more fine grained 
comparisons of all of these participants using map scores as a continuous predictor of eye-
movement variability.   
 
 Stimuli & procedures 
All stimuli and procedures were identical to the Context condition in Experiment 4a 
except for the inclusion of the Map Task.  All participants were presented the Context version of 
the film clip.  Before presentation of the clip, participants were given the Map Task instructions 
to draw a detailed map of the locations in the scene, including labels, at the end of the clip from 
memory.  After watching the clip, they were prompted to make the inference about what would 
happen next.  After this they were given an 8 1/2’’ by 11’’ sheet of paper with the instructions 
printed at the top and grid lines for the map.  They had 5 minutes to complete their map.   
 
 Data analysis 
All predictive inference and eye-movement analyses for the Map Task participants were 
the same as presented previously.  To score the maps, we used the automated Gardony Map 
Analyzer (Gardony et al., 2015).  This starts with a master configuration map given as input to 
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the software with all relevant locations labeled.  Then, each participant’s drawn map is scanned, 
input to the software, its labeled locations are marked, and it is compared to the master map and 
given a similarity score.  We used the SQRT (Canonical Accuracy) measure in the Gardony map 
analysis program (Gardony et al., 2015), which is a general measure that scores both on the 
number and configuration of landmarks.  To create the master configuration map, Google Earth 
was used to find the actual streets (in Venice, CA) on which the opening scene of Touch of Evil 
was filmed.
7
 With the layout of the street, each of the locations in the clip were placed as 
accurately as possible to their location on the Google Map.  This gave us an objectively accurate 
map of the scene, which would give participants who drew the most accurate maps the highest 
scores using the map analyzer.   
 
 Results 
 Predictive inference 
Inference data was analyzed for all 75 participants that completed the experiment.  Initial 
coding by two raters showed an interrater reliability of Kappa = .945, p < .001.  Due to the high 
reliability, the one discrepancy between raters was resolved by discussion to give a single 
inference made or not made for each participant.   
The inference results for the Map Task condition were compared to those in the free 
viewing Context condition, which we will refer to as the “Comprehension condition” since both 
conditions viewed the same Context condition video clip, but the free viewing group’s implied 
task was to comprehend the film clip.  Participants in the Map Task condition were less likely to 
make the inference about the bomb (Mean Proportion = .13) than those in the Comprehension 
condition (Mean Proportion = .50, (X
2
 (1, N = 205) = 27.56, p < .001, Eta = .367).  This indicates 
that the Map Task was cognitively at odds with the process of narrative comprehension (i.e., all 
participants had identical visual information available, including seeing the bomb put in the car, 
                                                 
7
 Numerous “Touch of Evil” fan websites discuss the filming location of this classic film, and particularly the 
famous opening scene in Venice Beach, California.  Based on one such site (Robh, 2011), and our own judgment 
comparing the film with current and archival photos of the area, we chose the streets on Google Maps to use.  The 
shot starts at a lot near the corner of Windward Ave. and Speedway.  From there the shot goes South West on 
Woodward Ave. to what is now Ocean Front Walk.  From there the shot goes North West on Ocean Front Walk.   
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but processed it differently to complete their given tasks).  The key question is whether part of 
the difference in processing was the deployment of overt visual attention as measured by eye-
movements. 
 
 Eye-movements 
Eye-movement analyses compared participants in the Map Task to participants in the 
Comprehension condition who made the inference.  These two groups represent participants that 
most successfully completed their respective tasks; either create a mental map of the scene or 
comprehend the narrative.  Context condition participants that did not make the inference and 
No-context participants are not presented in the analyses below, because in all previous 
experiments their eye-movement data did not significantly differ from the Comprehension 
condition.  Similarly, although only the Map Task and Comprehension conditions are reported 
below, for exploratory purposes, analyses for all other conditions were run.  All of the 
relationships presented hold in ANOVA’s that include participants in the Context condition that 
did not make the inference and in the No-context, as well as participants in the Map Task that did 
make the inference. 
 
 Fixation durations and saccade lengths 
All data was cleaned using the same procedures as outlined in Experiment 2.  For fixation 
durations, there were no significant differences between the groups.  In the Comprehension 
group the average fixation duration was 388 ms (SD = 63 ms)
8
, and in the Map Task group it 
was 361 ms (SD = 47 ms)(t (100) = .695, p = .489).   
Mean saccade length between groups, however, did show a significant difference.  
Consistent with our hypotheses based on the results of Lahnakoski et al. (2014) and Smith and 
Mital (2013), average saccades were longer in the Map Task group (M = 5.39, SD = .68) than 
in the Comprehension group (M = 4.79, SD = .55)(t (100) = 4.56, p < .001; d = 0.91).  We 
hypothesized that this would occur because the Map task participants would make longer 
                                                 
8
 Although this is the same data as used in Experiment 4a for the Context + inference group, the average fixation 
duration presented here is slightly different.  This is because the comprehension group average is for the entire video 
clip rather than just the shared viewing period with the No-context condition analyzed in Experiment 4a.  
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saccades in order to explore the edges of the scene to complete their task, thereby (at least 
partially) ignoring the main characters of the narrative that are typically shown near the center of 
the screen, which would require shorter saccades to explore. 
 
 Attentional synchrony 
Attentional synchrony results.  The gaze similarity analysis compared Comprehension 
group participants to those in the Map Task across the entirety of the film clip.  Figure 11 shows 
the results of this comparison. 
 
 
Figure 11. Top: Similarity of gaze by context condition across the full clip.  Gaze similarity is 
expressed as a z-score probability relative to the context condition and inference made 
(Comprehension group [Blue], Map Task [Red], and Shuffled Baseline [Black]).  Large values 
indicate greater attentional synchrony. Vertical dashed grey lines illustrate the quarters used in 
the repeated measures analysis. Bottom: The stills exemplify gaze patterns during a) high gaze 
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similarity (GS) for both groups, b) high GS for Comprehension, low for Map Task, and c) low 
GS for both. 
 
Qualitatively, Figure 11 shows that gaze similarity scores for the Comprehension group 
are often higher than for the Map Task group, indicating that viewers in the Map Task were 
looking at different places on those given frames than the Comprehension group.  To quantify 
this relationship an ANOVA of mean gaze similarity by group was calculated.  Consistent with 
the qualitative assessment of the figure, an ANOVA supports the difference between each group 
(F (2, 166) = 96.484, p < .001, ηp2 = .541), with Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons 
showing the comprehension group had the greatest gaze similarity (M = .001, SD = .266), 
followed by the Map Task (M = -.284, SD = .234), and the shuffled baseline (M = -.488, SD = 
.045) was the lowest.  Nevertheless, Figure 11 also shows that the Map Task group was 
frequently above the shuffled baseline, and mimicked many of the peaks and troughs of the 
Comprehension group.  This supports the prediction that even when the task is at odds with 
comprehension, it may be difficult to completely ignore areas associated with comprehension.  
The tyranny of film is perhaps not being turned off, but it is being turned down. 
In addition to the main effects, an inspection of Figure 11 indicates that there may be an 
interaction of gaze similarity with time.  An exploratory, repeated measures ANOVA of task and 
time in the clip was conducted to better understand the role the features of the clip play in 
determining gaze similarity.  As noted in the Introduction, we chose the Touch of Evil film clip, 
in part, because it has bottom-up features that should reduce attentional synchrony.  However, 
the presence of visual features that may guide attention changes throughout the clip.  For the 
repeated measures ANOVA, the clip was broken into quarters that correspond well to the 
changes in visual features in the clip (more detail on these features in the interpretation below).  
The sphericity assumption was violated (X
2
 (5) = 36.077, p < .001), thus a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction was used (Ɛ =.869).  As with the one-way ANOVA, there was a main effect of time 
block (F (2.60, 427.76) = 177.113, p < .001, ηp2 = .519).  Bonferroni corrected pairwise 
comparisons showed that each time block was significantly different from the others; block 1 had 
the highest gaze similarity (M = -.114, SD = .419), followed by block 2 (M = -.227, SD = .355), 
then block 4 (M = -.266, SD = .313), and block 3 had the lowest gaze similarity (M = -.406, SD = 
.151).  Additionally, the task by time block interaction was significant (F (5.217, 427.758) = 
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71.430, p < .001, ηp2 = .466).  The interaction was probed using simple effects where time block 
was held constant over task.  The Greenhouse-Geisser corrected omnibus error term was MSE = 
.016, and the df = 427.758.  Gaze similarity differed between all tasks in blocks 1, 2, and 4 (p’s < 
.001, F’s > 20.312)9.  However, in block 3, the Map task and the shuffled baseline were not 
significantly different F (1, 427.758) = 2.375, p > .05, while all other task comparisons in block 
3 were significantly different (p’s < .001, F’s > 34.187).   
The main effect of time block and the interaction with task support previous work on the 
features that guide attentional synchrony when a qualitative analysis of the features of a film clip 
in each block is used.  As shown in Figure 11 (Top) Block 1 has the highest gaze similarity, and 
qualitatively has features that would support this (Figure 11, Bottom, A), (e.g., close ups of the 
bomb and car, and relatively little else to look at).  Figure 11 shows that Blocks 2 and 4 which 
have moderate levels of gaze similarity and moderately more to look at (Figure 11, Bottom, B), 
(e.g., more store fronts).  Block 3 has the lowest gaze similarity, and the most complex 
composition involving lots of people, vehicles, animals, and store fronts (Figure 11, Bottom, C).  
The complexity in Block 3 is precisely what we predicted would reduce attentional synchrony 
overall when we chose the Touch of Evil film clip (Cutting et al., 2011; Dorr et al., 2010; Mital et 
al., 2010).  Additionally, the large number of storefronts and spread out locations in Block 3 is 
what would be predicted to reduce gaze similarity in the Map Task, consistent with the lack of a 
difference between the Map Task and the shuffled baseline in Block 3. 
 
 Region of interest 
Region of interest results.  The same region of interest data pre-processing as in 
Experiment 2 was used.  The car was identified as the region of interest, and we tested whether 
participants in the Comprehension group fixated the car more often than in the Map Task group.  
The region of interest analysis was carried out over the entire viewing period. 
As can be seen in Figure 12 the red line for participants that completed the Map Task is 
fairly consistently below that of the blue line for the Comprehension group, which is not 
surprising considering that car fixations vary with the size of the car on the screen.  A t-test 
comparing the proportion of fixations of the car (when on the screen) for each group confirmed 
                                                 
9
 The full simple effects structure is in Appendix B 
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that participants in the Comprehension group fixated the car significantly more often (10.2% of 
fixations) than participants in the Map Task group (6.5% of fixations)(t (100) = 3.706, p < .001; 
d = 0.74).  A similar result was shown when overall dwell time on the car was calculated for 
each group.  As with the proportion of fixations, the total time spent on the car was larger for 
participants in the Comprehension group (16.9 sec; SD = 10.8 sec) than for the Map group (11.6 
sec, SD = 7.1 sec)(t (100) = 2.653, p = .009; d = 0.53). 
 
 
Figure 12. Top: Proportion of participants fixating the car throughout the film clip 
(Comprehension Group [Blue], Map Task Group [Red]).  The higher the value the more 
participants looked at the car.  The car first appears in the clip at frame 541, which is in time bin 
570.  Bottom: Film stills show the region of interest for the frame, with fixation and heat maps 
superimposed.  The stills indicate a) when both groups fixated the car at a similar rate, and b) 
when the car first reappears and was highly fixated by the Comprehension group, but not the 
Map group. 
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Taken together, the region of interest results are consistent with our predictions for the 
Map Task.  The car is integral for comprehension of the film clip, but is relatively unimportant 
for completing the Map Task.  Accordingly, participants in the Comprehension group look at the 
car more than participants in the Map Task.  As a result, the region of interest results again show 
the tyranny of film being reduced through the high level cognitive task manipulation of the Map 
Task.  Nevertheless, as with the gaze similarity analysis above, participants in the Map Task 
condition still looked at the car occasionally, indicating that the reduction of the tyranny of film 
was relative, but not complete.   
 
 Discussion 
Experiment 4a tested the role of context on comprehension and eye-movements, and 
Experiment 4b tested the role of task.  The results of 4a showed a limited effect of 
comprehension, as manipulated by context, on eye-movements.  That limited effect was only for 
fixation durations and during a critical period when there was a difference in the perceived 
agents in the film, which affected visual attention.  To test whether the tyranny of film could be 
turned-off by an explicit task at odds with comprehending the film narrative, Experiment 4b 
compared the Context + inference group with the Map Task condition (and since comprehending 
the narrative was the implicit task for the participants in the Context + inference group, we 
relabeled it as the Comprehension condition for that comparison).  The results of this comparison 
showed a meaningful and statistically significant reduction in both the gaze similarity and 
probability of looking at the chief area of interest (the car) due to the task manipulation.  Thus, 
we can say that an explicit viewing task that was at odds with the task of comprehension turned-
down the tyranny of film.  Because we showed experimentally induced variation in the degree of 
the tyranny of film, this suggests that our previously shown dissociation between comprehension 
(as manipulated by context) and eye-movements may be a true null effect rather than being due 
to a weak manipulation of comprehension or poor measures of the cognitive effects on eye-
movements.  This is something that will need to be tested more, as the likelihood that it is a true 
null effect can be ascertained through a programmatic approach of attempts to reject the null.  It 
also suggests that the online control of eye-movements in dynamic scenes is highly task 
dependent.   
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Chapter 6 - General Discussion 
When we watch visual narratives in film, television, and perhaps in our real world 
environment we seem to be able to comprehend them fairly easily.  How is it that we might be 
able to take purely visual input and create a coherent narrative of the events that unfold? Through 
a series of four experiments we found strong effects of knowledge of the bomb on 
comprehension on predictive inference generation and event segmentation.  Despite this, there 
was an overall lack of an effect on eye-movements, except when a cognitive task at odds with 
narrative comprehension was used. 
 
 Rethinking the tyranny of film 
One potential reason for the overall lack of an effect of comprehension on eye-
movements with Touch of Evil (Welles, 1958) could be that even though it was chosen for what 
appeared to be weak bottom-up features, it still guided participant eye-movements as much as 
the Moonraker (Broccoli & Gilbert, 1979) film clip used in the previous study (Loschky et al., 
2015).  However, Figures 13a and 13b clearly show Moonraker has more clustering on fewer 
clusters than Touch of Evil.  Furthermore, as would be expected based on the gaze similarity 
results, the Map Task had even less clustering than all other conditions
10
.  Thus, it seems that 
even films with relatively weak bottom-up features show little effect of comprehension on eye-
movements.  Touch of Evil does have relatively weak bottom-up features when compared to 
Moonraker, yet the comprehension and eye-movement results are analogous.   
 
                                                 
10
 The lack of a difference in the number of clusters for the Map Task and the other Touch of Evil conditions makes 
sense, because as the overall clustering lessens there are going to be fewer groupings of gaze that are identified as a 
cluster.   
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Figure 13. a) The average sum weighted gaze covariance for all eye-tracking conditions in the 
James Bond Moonraker (Loschky et al., 2015) and Touch of Evil studies.  The orange  bars are 
from the Moonraker study, the blue bars are from the Touch of Evil comprehension conditions, 
and the red bar is the Touch of Evil Map task.  b) The average number of gaze clusters for the 
same experiments.   
 
These results call for a reconsideration of the tyranny of film hypothesis, which states 
that there is no opportunity for differences in comprehension to be expressed through differences 
in eye-movements due to bottom-up guidance of viewer attention by visual features.  Clearly, 
fewer people are looking at the same places at the same times in Touch of Evil than in 
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Moonraker, yet, we still find few if any effects of large differences in comprehension (as 
manipulated by context) on eye-movements.   
 
Top-down attention is slow and effortful.  One reason for the lack of a top-down effect 
during film viewing may be the relationship between film comprehension and eye-movements is 
simply very weak at best.  Eye-movement models offer some support for the weak relationship 
between bottom-up and top-down processes during film viewing.  For example, highly produced 
films cut frequently, creating a new visual scene every few seconds which may keep the visual 
system in a stage of early processing that relies more heavily on bottom-up features (Mital et al, 
2010).  The Touch of Evil clip was chosen in part because it doesn’t have editing that introduces 
a new shot every 2-3 seconds, but it may be that the introduction of new information due to the 
camera continuously tracking in the shot creates a similar effect of keeping the viewer in an early 
stage of processing that relies more on bottom up attention.   
Within the Findlay and Walker (1999) model of saccade generation, there are early stages 
of processing that are said to be automatic initially, then automated, and then more volitional.  
What this means is that in early visual processing of a scene saccades are carried out before the 
visual system can voluntarily select information.  In the current study, the voluntary selection 
would be of bomb-relevant information in the narrative.  The automatic and automated 
processing could occur in Touch of Evil because eye-movements are being driven only by 
bottom-up Behaviorally this is consistent with work showing that it takes approximately 2-3 
seconds before eye-movements show strong effects of top-down processes in scenes (Parkhurst, 
Law, & Niebur, 2002; Tatler, Baddeley, & Gilchrist, 2005; Zelinsky, Adeli, & Vitu, 2016).    
The reason for slower top-down effects in scenes is that executive control of eye-
movements is effortful and uses more executive attentional resources.  Such executive control of 
eye-movements generally involves the activation of the frontal eye fields (FEF), which are 
essential for performing the anti-saccade task (i.e., looking in the opposite direction an equal 
distance from a target that appears to the left or right of fixation) (Findlay & Walker, 1999; 
Guitton, Buchtel, & Douglas, 1985; Odriscoll et al., 1995; Sweeney, Mintun, Kwee, & Wiseman, 
1996).  Working memory resources are also influential in explicit cognitive control, and such 
tasks become more difficult as one’s memory resources decline due to dual tasking, aging, or 
brain damage (Mitchell, Macrae, & Gilchrist, 2002; Roberts, Hager, & Heron, 1994).  
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Conversely, the pro-saccade task (i.e., looking at a target that appears to the left or right of 
fixation) and the capture of attention by salient stimuli strongly involves the superior colliculus 
and the posterior parietal cortex (Boehnke & Munoz, 2008; Kustov & Robinson, 1996, 
November 7).  We hypothesize that this seemingly effortless control of eye-movements in the 
pro-saccade task may be more similar to watching a film for comprehension.  Further, we 
hypothesize there is a fundamental difference between the control of eye-movements during the 
comprehension of film, and task based control of eye-movements for the Map Task that required 
participants to inhibit processing of the focal features of the clip in order to deploy attention to 
the periphery of the shot.  Further research is needed to directly test this hypothesis.  This could 
be done by testing the effect of cognitive loads on eye-movements during the performance of 
comprehension versus others tasks such as the Map Task. If the Map Task requires more 
executive control than the comprehension task, a cognitive load would be expected to more 
greatly affect eye-movements during the Map Task than the comprehension task (i.e., 
participants in the Map Task would have eye-movements more similar to those in the 
Comprehension condition).   
 
When comprehension has an effect.  Although top-down processes are slow and 
effortful, there was the agent effect in Experiment 4, and small effects of the event model were 
also found in Loschky et al. (2015).  Thus, film comprehension can have an impact on visual 
attention during film viewing.  Interestingly, the effects found may have occurred through 
different mechanisms. The agent effect found in the current study appears to have occurred 
because participants in the No-context condition continued to track the agents (the walking 
couple) in their event model, which may have been a more automated process using the term 
from Findlay and Walker (1999).  Conversely, the effect in Loschky et al. (2015) appears to have 
occurred due to the No-context group needing to use effortful process to update their mental 
model with what was presented.  Based on this, differences in eye-movements may be related to 
the amount of effortful processing the viewer used to comprehend a scene.  The Map Task 
similarly required effortful updating to successfully complete the task.  The importance of the 
potential need for effortful processing is that it may indicate the variable strength of the different 
components of mental models used to comprehend narratives (Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 
1995), and how effortful their updating is.  In the four experiments, we only manipulated two of 
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the five indices of the event indexing model (agent and causality).  A more comprehensive study 
manipulating all five indices (agent, time, place, causality, and intentionality [goal-relevance]) 
may give a clearer picture of the effect of each of these event indices on attention.  We 
hypothesize that when an event index must be effortfully updated to maintain comprehension for 
a narrative, it will predictably guide eye-movements. 
More generally, the different effect sizes of the Map Task and the agent effect point 
toward a continuum of higher level cognitive effects on eye-movements during narrative film 
viewing.  The Map Task is more similar to the task manipulations that have been used to fairly 
consistently show strong top-down effects on eye-movements in scenes and videos (DeAngelus 
& Pelz, 2009; Lahnakoski et al., 2014; Smith & Mital, 2013; Yarbus, 1967).  Conversely, the 
agent effect may be a much weaker top-down process on the continuum, but is still strong 
enough to break the tyranny of film.  An even weaker effect, or overall lack of an effect, may be 
the null effect of expertise found in Taya et al. (2012).   
There is much work to be done on the larger continuum of top-down effects of higher 
level cognition on eye-movements (for review, Baluch & Itti, 2011).  For example, in real life, 
viewers continuously selectively expose themselves to the media they are interested in by 
choosing the websites they go to, the movies they attend, and the television channels they flip to 
(Hart et al., 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009; Stroud, 2008).  On a more micro level, 
movie viewers sometimes close their eyes during certain parts of movies, or avert their gaze from 
something they do not want to see in the detail afforded by the fovea.  Similarly, if a film viewer 
is asked to only look at the top right corner of the screen, this is something that most could do, 
although depending on their interest in the film they are watching, it could be a somewhat 
difficult, unenjoyable task.  Therefore, tasks, such as the Map Task, that are at odds with the 
filmmaker’s objectives, will require viewers to exert executive control of their overt attention 
(Fan, McCandliss, Fossella, Flombaum, & Posner, 2005; Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & 
Posner, 2002). 
 
What breaks the tyranny of film?  Despite the ambiguity of what drives the tyranny of 
film, the dissociation between eye-movements and narrative comprehension is very surprising in 
Touch of Evil, especially with the strength and consistency of the differences in comprehension 
between the groups.  These findings are inconsistent with the majority of previous work looking 
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at top-down task-based effects on scene viewing (Foulsham & Underwood, 2007; Henderson et 
al., 2007; Henderson et al., 2013; Smith & Mital, 2013; Yarbus, 1967).   
One characteristic of this finding is that it is inconsistent with a strict interpretation of the 
“eye-mind hypothesis” (Just & Carpenter, 1980; Reichle et al., 1998; Reilly & Radach, 2006).  It 
appears that the dimension of causality, in relation to the bomb, in participants’ mental models is 
not guiding eye-movements, while agency is having a small effect.  This does not necessarily 
indicate that these components cannot affect eye-movements.  It is possible that, for example, 
because the bomb is hidden in the trunk of the car that viewers chose not to look at its hiding 
place.
11
  This interpretation of the results would argue for a weaker version of the “eye-mind 
hypothesis.”  Namely, depending on viewers’ tasks and goals, there can be dissociations between 
eye-movements and thought (Lamont, Henderson, & Smith, 2010; Smith, 2015).   
This weak version of the “eye-mind hypothesis” may be due in part to film viewing being 
driven by both bottom-up features and mandatory top-down processes (Baluch & Itti, 2011).  
Mandatory top-down processes are well-learned, more automated processes, as opposed to 
volitional top-down processes.  A classic mandatory process is the hollow face illusion, when a 
concave face (e.g., the inside of a mask), is perceived as convex (Baluch & Itti, 2011; Gregory, 
1970).  Another example is following the speaker of a conversation (Birmingham et al., 2008).  
Within film viewing, the task of comprehension may have certain mandatory processes used to 
construct a mental model.  One of these could be to identify and locate key agents in the 
narrative, and attend to them, as suggested by the agent effect found in Experiment 4a.  This type 
of top-down process may operate at a lower level than the manipulation causality used in the 
current study.   
One recent theory that may support this is the role of the default mode network in 
narrative comprehension (Tylén et al., 2015).  That is, the default mode network may allow for 
the accumulation of coherent plot information.  Conversely, when plot information is less 
coherent, the frontoparietal control network is thought to allow for a more effortful search for 
narrative coherence through a more top-down deployment of attention.  The reason for this is 
                                                 
11
 Of course, our results suggest that about half of the viewers who knew about the bomb were unable to hold it in 
their WM to the end of the clip.  Yet, those participants (Context+No-inference) were just as likely to look at the car 
as those who did not forget it (Context+Inference), or those who never knew about the bomb (No-context+No-
inference). 
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that the default mode network has been shown to be less active when visual attention is 
effortfully deployed (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Huang, & Buckner, 2010; Andrews-Hanna, 
Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010).  When considering the highly complex visual 
stimulus of a film, it may seem that the default mode network should not play a large role, but 
fMRI research with film viewing has indicated activation of the default mode network (Hasson et 
al., 2008; Hasson, Malach, & Heeger, 2010).  Additionally, areas thought to make up part of the 
default mode network have been shown to be similarly activated during both film viewing and 
audio book listening (Hasson et al., 2008). 
 Within film viewing, breaking the tyranny of film may have two potential paths.  The 
first could be to directly tap into a mandatory process (e.g., agent tracking).  If the narrative one 
viewer perceives in a scene has entirely different characters than the narrative another viewer 
perceives in the same scene, they should track different agents.  This was one of the hypotheses 
tested in the current study, but the film clip used appears to have been well constructed to give 
high importance to both the walking couple and the couple in the car.  Specifically, the car is 
initially tracked by the camera, but when the walking couple is introduced the camera begins to 
track them while the car with the bomb lurks more in the periphery of the frame, or off-screen.  
The other track to breaking the tyranny of film is to move away from mandatory processing and 
automated comprehension processes.  The Map Task appears to have done this, but it should be 
possible with a comprehension manipulation as well.  For example, in Loschky et al. (2015), the 
effect on eye-movements occurred during a complex cross cutting sequence that required 
viewers to make an inference (that both sequences would come together in time and space and 
solve the life-and-death problem faced by the protagonist in one of the two sequences).  The 
viewers that had more trouble making the inference about a critical shot showed eye-movement 
differences during that shot.  However, this shot was essentially a static scene, and thus did not 
use any film features to guide viewer attention.  Nevertheless, future work could test if a break in 
coherence allows viewers to move from mandatory processing to more effortful, volitional 
processing even during dynamic scenes in a film.     
 
Applications.  Dynamic stimuli such as film are often designed to guide eye-movements 
based on the purpose of viewing the dynamic stimulus (e.g., film narrative comprehension).  
However, there are many situations during which it may be beneficial for a viewer to attend 
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somewhere other than the location specified by the dynamic stimulus.  One common example of 
this is the use of videos in a classroom setting.  Instructors will often use videos as examples, 
even though the video may have been designed for another purpose.  For example, a Women’s 
Studies instructor may want to guide students’ attention to aspects of the film other than those 
intended by the film-maker (e.g., to gender-stereotyped elements in a scene which are simply 
considered by the film-maker to a part of the scene’s background).  The difficulty of breaking the 
tyranny of film with the Map Task indicates that instructors may have a similarly difficult time 
guiding their students’ attention to other appropriate information in a video clip that was not 
specifically designed for the instructor’s pedagogical purposes.   
A poor control of attention during video viewing could have detrimental effects when it 
comes to learning.  Research on eye-movements and problem solving has shown a strong 
connection between where people look and their ability to solve a problem (Grant & Spivey, 
2003; Madsen, Larson, Loschky, & Rebello, 2012).  Additionally, and more importantly for the 
current research, cues that guide eye-movements to the appropriate areas can increase the 
probability of correct problem solving (Madsen, Rouinfar, Larson, Loschky, & Rebello, 2013; 
Rouinfar, Agra, Larson, Rebello, & Loschky, 2014; Thomas & Lleras, 2007).  This establishes a 
strong, bidirectional relationship between comprehension and eye-movements in problem 
solving.  Within film, when a viewer has little ability to volitionally control their eye-
movements, guidance to the wrong areas could lead to an inability to attend to the appropriate 
information, potentially an incorrect understanding of concepts, and hinder critical thinking on 
the topic. 
 
 Summary 
The current study tested whether a person’s comprehension during film viewing affects 
their eye-movements.  The differences in comprehension we found were consistent with similar 
research in reading comprehension, but novel to film comprehension research.  However, despite 
these large comprehension differences, similar to our previous study that used a very different 
film clip (Loschky et al., 2015) we found only small and targeted differences in eye-movements.  
These findings are counterintuitive based on work looking at top-down effects on eye-
movements in static scenes (Smith & Mital, 2013; Yarbus, 1967), but consistent with the finding 
of strong attentional synchrony in film viewing (Dorr et al., 2010; Mital et al., 2010; Smith & 
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Mital, 2013; Wang et al., 2012).  Based on this, the tyranny of film hypothesis was mostly 
supported.  The comprehension processes used in visual narratives seem to be similar to those 
used in reading.  This is based on the similarities between the relationship of working memory 
with comprehension and the event segmentation results in this study with what has been shown 
in reading studies (Allbritton, 2004; Calvo, 2001, 2005; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Daneman 
& Merikle, 1996; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Kurby & Zacks, 2008; Linderholm, 2002; Rai et al., 
2014; Rai et al., 2011; Speer & Zacks, 2005; St George et al., 1997; Zacks et al., 2009).  
However, the processes by which information is extracted through eye-movements appears to 
differ between visual narratives and reading (Magliano et al., 2013), as seen in the general 
dissociation between eye-movements and comprehension.  The results are interesting in terms of 
both film comprehension processes and eye-movement processes in film perception, but the 
dissociation of these processes may be the most interesting.  During typical film viewing people 
may attend to the same places, but have different understandings of the narrative.  This is a 
counter-example to the common assumption in many eye-movement studies that there is a strong 
association between eye-movements and thought (Just & Carpenter, 1980; Reichle et al., 1998; 
Reilly & Radach, 2006).  The inclusion of the Map Task condition in Experiment 4 indicates that 
tasks at odds with film narrative comprehension can provide support for cognitive control of eye-
movements, supporting the eye-mind hypothesis.  However, at the level of mental model 
construction during film narratives, the underlying task may be too similar to allow for large eye-
movement differences to be expressed.  To better understand this dissociation of eye-movements 
and comprehension during film viewing, future studies need to combine techniques and theories 
from the fields of scene perception, event perception, and narrative comprehension (Loschky, 
Hutson, Magliano, Larson, & Smith, 2016; Loschky, Hutson, Magliano, Larson, & Smith, 2014, 
June; Magliano, Larson, Higgs, & Loschky, 2016).  Enriching our understanding of when and 
how we perceive and comprehend visual information from our environment can lead to a better 
understanding of even higher order processes such as decision making, reasoning (Madsen et al., 
2013; McNamara & Magliano, 2009; Rouinfar et al., 2014; Thomas & Lleras, 2007), and 
generally how we interact with our immediate environment, because comprehension of our 
environment is integral to our interaction with (Loschky et al., 2016; Loschky et al., 2014, June; 
Magliano et al., 2016).  
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Appendix A - Map Task Instructions 
Map Task Instructions: 
Your task is to watch a video clip of a town, and after you finish, draw a map of the area 
depicted from memory.  Your map should be as detailed as possible including naming and 
labeling as many locations as possible.  Your map will be scored for its level of detail and 
accuracy.  You have 5 minutes to complete your map. 
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Appendix B - Map Task Score Examples 
Low Map Score (0.0) 
a) Ambiguous Labels                                        b) Locations not identified 
 
 
Median Map Score (.17) 
a)  4 locations labeled                                     b) 4 locations labeled 
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Top-Scores (.37 & .38) 
a) .37 (7 locations given near correct location)     b) .38 (7 locations given near correct location) 
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Appendix C - Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance Simple Effects 
Simple Effects: 
Quarter held constant over condition: 
The omnibus error term was .016 and the degrees of freedom were 427.758. 
 
Quarter 1: 
 Context and Map: F =  2.417/.016; F (1, 427.758) = 151.062, p <.001 
 Context and Shuffle F =  18.020/.016; F (1, 427.758) = 1126.25, p <.001 
 Map and Shuffle F =  4.248/.016; F (1, 427.758) = 265.5, p <.001 
 
 
Quarter 2: 
 Context and Map: F =  4.426/.016; F (1, 427.758) = 276.625, p <.001 
 Context and Shuffle F =  9.857/.016; F (1, 427.758) = 616.062, p <.001 
 Map and Shuffle F =  .325/.016; F (1, 427.758) = 20.312, p <.001 
 
 
Quarter 3: 
 Context and Map: F =  .547/.016; F (1, 427.758) = 34.187, p <.001 
 Context and Shuffle F =  1.204/.016; F (1, 427.758) = 75.25, p <.001 
 Map and Shuffle F =  .038/.016; F (1, 427.758) = 2.375, p > .05 
 
 
Quarter 4: 
 Context and Map: F =  1.254/.016; F (1, 427.758) = 78.375, p <.001 
 Context and Shuffle F =  7.059/.016; F (1, 427.758) = 441.188, p <.001 
 Map and Shuffle F =  1.307/.016; F (1, 427.758) = 81.688, p <.001 
 
